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While often considered a purely ￿nancial institution, the IMF has
throughout its history performed non-￿nancial services for its member-
ship. The latest such example is the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), a
certi￿cation mechanism established in 2005 for which only poor members
are eligible. Based on a formal game-theoretic model, I argue that it is
unlikely that the PSI will serve well its intended goal of facilitating capital
market access for members requesting the service. Their low income, the
lack of signi￿cant consequences for markets, the IMF￿ s traditional reluc-
tance to criticise members, as well as the need to promote the use of the
new arrangement indicate that the Fund could emphasise participants￿
welfare over the interests of private lenders. The continued importance of
foreign aid in eligible countries also puts the IMF in the role of gatekeeping
such ￿ ows, which might con￿ ict with sending clear signals to commercial
actors. All these reasons imply that in many cases its seal of approval
will be of little use to third-parties, despite the high standards to which
PSI-countries are supposed to adhere. The best argument in favour of the
PSI being a useful addition to the Fund￿ s tool kit for low-income members
is the fact that several countries have already signed a second one.
JEL: F33, F34, F35.
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1 Introduction
The IMF serves many functions, but it seems fair to say that the main focus
has been on the ￿nancial services it provides. While noting that surveillance
activities account for 42% of the IMF￿ s budget, Bordo and James (2000: 9)
claim that ￿[t]he IMF is primarily a ￿nancial institution.￿There is some merit
in this view, but it might obscure the fact that the Fund has always provided
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1many non-￿nancial services to its members. Indeed, some argue that the need
for multilateral surveillance is the very reason for the existence of the IMF
(GuitiÆn 1992: 12): ￿There is a well-de￿ned common thread that binds together
all the activities of the IMF: the promotion and safeguarding of an international
code of conduct. [...] The IMF is primarily a surveillance institution, and
its other activities derive their legitimacy from the surveillance mandate laid
out in the Articles of Agreement.￿Surveillance of members is carried out on
a regular basis, usually yearly, in what is known as Article IV consultations.
In the process, the IMF gathers an enormous amount of information about the
economy of each member as well as the policies of the government. Similar
processes take place in the context of negotiations of ￿nancial arrangements
with members. In addition, the IMF continually monitors and analyses the
economies of members. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the IMF
has an informational advantage vis-a-vis third-parties when it comes to the state
they are in (Rodrik 1996, Hagen 2009).
It is also the case that throughout its history the IMF has deliberated on
the impressions its actions convey to non-members. This includes signals sent
in the context of standard ￿nancial arrangements (e.g. whether or not to grant
a member￿ s request for access to resources beyond those semi-automatically
available to all members) and precautionary facilities (where a member obtains
an option to draw on the Fund only if speci￿c events occur), but also in a
long list of more or less ad-hoc non-￿nancial mechanisms.1 Most of the latter
can be described as certi￿cation devices, where the IMF makes public claims
about certain aspects of economic conditions and policies in member countries.
These mechanisms have been considered problematic for various reasons, such
as the (lack of) clarity as to what they signal or their low dimensionality. For
example, simple endorsements of the policies of a member only tell third-parties
whether the programme is on track or not according to a standard, not the
extent to which it is on or o⁄-track or in what areas. Moreover, the standards
used have not always been explicit, creating confusion as to the value of the seal
of approval.
The IMF￿ s latest mechanism of certi￿cation is called the Policy Support
Instrument (PSI), and was approved by the Executive Board in October 2005.2
The PSI is aimed at the poorer members, mostly low-income countries (LICs).3
1See the excellent discussion of the pros and cons of various mechanisms for signalling the
private information of the Fund to outsiders without committing ￿nancial resources, including
those that are defunct or never made it past the proposal-stage, in IMF (2004).
2See IMF (2005a) as well as Policy Support Instrument - Framework, Decision No. 13561-
(05/85), as amended. The PSI framework was slightly revised in connection with the revamp-
ing of the Fund￿ s concessional facilities in January 2010, c.f. A New Architecture of Facilities
for Low-Income Countries and Reform of the Fund￿ s Concessional Financing Framework, De-
cision No. 14385-(09/79).
3More speci￿cally, the board has stated that the PSI is open to all members eligible for
assistance under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, provided that they: ￿(a) have a
policy framework focused on consolidating macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability,
while deepening structural reforms in key areas in which growth and poverty reduction are
constrained; and (b) seek to maintain a close policy dialogue with the Fund, through the
Fund￿ s endorsement and assessment of their economic and ￿nancial policies [...].￿
2It is expected to be a service to so-called ￿mature stabilisers￿ , i.e., countries
having achieved a modicum of macroeconomic stability allowing them the leeway
to eschew Fund-￿nancing. The Fund argues that even though these have in a
sense graduated from its concessional credit facilities, they might still want
its approval of their policies. While such countries are of course subject to
regular Article IV surveillance, the PSI will provide an explicit endorsement as
well as more frequent assessments of a member￿ s policies. In contrast to the
compulsory nature of Article IV surveillance the PSI is supposed to be demand-
driven. So far, six countries (see Table 1) - Cape Verde, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda - have some experience with a PSI, with the
Fund claiming interest from other members as well.4 The current ￿nancial crisis
might have dampened this interest somewhat. However, it is noteworthy that
while three of the ￿ve countries with an ongoing PSI have found it necessary to
access IMF money, Cape Verde and Uganda did not. Moreover, Mozambique,
Senegal, and Tanzania are all back on the PSI only and Rwanda has recently
become the seventh member to request and have a PSI approved. This indicates
that the crisis has not viped out the demand for a non-￿nancial programme of
this type. One can therefore expect the PSI to continue into the near future at
least.
[Table 1 about here]
A natural question to ask is why these LICs prefer a PSI programme to a
funded one.5 The standards to which they are supposed to adhere in order to
gain the Fund￿ s approval - upper tranche conditionality - are the same. And
they still qualify for concessional funding. It is true that the subsidy in IMF
concessional lending is small compared to both IDA (much longer repayment pe-
riod) and much of the bilateral aid they receive (nowadays mostly 100% grants).
But as many of the PSI-programme countries seek nonconcessional funding (see
below) this cannot be the main argument for eschewing the opportunity to bor-
row from the Fund. It thus seems reasonable to venture that there must be
a di⁄erence in the type of signal the IMF sends to third-parties after having
evaluated the policies of a LIC member with a lending programme and one
with a PSI. Indeed, in the few academic papers dealing with the PSI one ￿nds
two opposing views. Bevan (2009) and Taylor (2006) are of the opinion that
non-funded programmes provide a stronger signal with respect to the quality
of economic policies by clarifying who is responsible for them and eliminating
a potential con￿ ict of interest for the Fund, which in the event that a member
country is already indebted to it would bene￿t from any catalytic e⁄ect of its
4According to Taylor (2006: 386): ￿[A] series of requests for this type of program from
the ￿nance ministers of HIPCs in Africa was what ￿rst put this idea on the reform agenda
[...]￿The IMF itself conducted surveys of both LIC-members as well as other stakeholders in
connection with both the initial decision as well as the ￿rst review of the PSI (IMF 2005b,
2009a). These surveys provide some support for there being such a demand. However, the
independent survey by Martin et al. (2009) paints a more sanguine picture.
5Cape Verde is currently classi￿ed as a lower middle-income country by the World Bank,
but falls under the exception of ￿small island economies.￿ For the sake of simplicity I will
sometimes speak of PSI-eligible IMF members as LICs, though there are potential and actual
exceptions to this rule like Cape Verde.
3seal of approval on ￿nancing from other sources.6 Building on an argument ￿rst
made by Rodrik (1996), Lane (2009) argues to the contrary: that the IMF has
a greater incentive to monitor policies when its own money is at stake. Being
better informed in this case, its seal of approval should convey a stronger signal.
In Hagen (2009) I investigated this issue and found that lending is not a nec-
essary condition for informative communication by the IMF. However, putting
its money where its mouth is enables the Fund to credibly reveal its private
information to third-parties in cases where mere certi￿cation does not.
With the PSI, the question of when the IMF￿ s signal has a greater e⁄ect on
other ￿nancial ￿ ows can in principle be addressed by data. However, while the
Fund has conducted its ￿rst review of experience with the PSI (IMF 2009a),
there are still too few data points to allow ￿rm conclusions to be drawn. So
for the moment we have to do with related work on the impact of ￿nancial
programmes. Bird and Rowlands (1997) contains a good discussion of the issues
as well as a summary of earlier empirical studies of the catalytic e⁄ect of IMF
lending. The more recent review of this literature by Cottarelli and Ginannini
(2002) supports their conclusion that it is weak. It is noteworthy, though,
that the average seems to be masking two opposing e⁄ects, a negative one on
private commercial ￿ ows and a positive one on o¢ cial ￿ ows.7 The latter is
probably related to the ￿gatekeeping￿ role highlighted as problematic by the
Fund￿ s own Independent Evaluation O¢ ce in its ￿rst report (IEO 2002). An
IMF programme has been a prerequisite for debt relief in the context of the Paris
Club and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). In addition,
both bilateral and multilateral donors have frequently viewed them as providing
the necessary quality control of the macroeconomic policies of aid recipients.8
Bird and Rowlands (2007) present recent econometric evidence to the e⁄ect
that the IMF thereby actually increases aid ￿ ows to poor member countries. As
argued by Radelet (2006) and Taylor (2006), for example, lending to perform
this role has had unfortunate consequences such as tying up IMF resources
that could have been better used in member countries with a real balance of
payments need, increasing the debt levels of members only seeking the IMF￿ s
seal of approval, and too much focus on stabilisation where the macroeconomic
situation has signi￿cantly improved. The PSI severs the connection between
IMF money and certi￿cation, providing a signal to the aid donors of the mature
stabilisers without these negative sidee⁄ects.
When it comes to private ￿ ows, ￿ve of the seven countries that have signed
6This is a variation on the theme that aid donors in general engage in defensive lending
(or granting) to avoid defaults by recipients on the debt they owe them. For more detail as
well as some indicative empirical results, see Birdsall et al. (2003) and Marchesi and Missale
(2007).
7Other studies look at these issues from somewhat di⁄erent angles. Gelos et al. (2008) and
Thomas (2009) analyse what factors give poor countries access to private capital markets. The
former ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of IMF programmes once the quality of policies is controlled
for, whereas the latter ￿nd that in contrast to IDA-eligible countries the market access of IDA
graduates is positively a⁄ected by the time spent in IMF programmes.
8According to Fraser and Whit￿eld (2009: 86), this praxis persists.
4a PSI so far are post-completion-point HIPCs.9 This means that their pro-
grammes have contained caps on non-concessional borrowing, as the creditors
that have provided debt relief seek to guard against free-riding by other po-
tential lenders and prevent a reemergence of debt distress. Even though the
PSI-countries have been given some room to contract new debt on such terms,
in contrast to most other HIPCs,10 the caps have been a continuous source of
contention in their negotiations with the IMF. If their performance holds up,
it is likely that they will be given even more space to court private commer-
cial sources of ￿nancing, particularly for infrastructure projects. For example,
the sta⁄ report for the new PSI for Uganda states that ￿[the programme] will
continue to target investment spending to address Uganda￿ s large infrastructure
gap while maintaining low in￿ ation, a ￿ exible exchange rate and a comfortable
level of international reserves. In view of prospective declines in aid, ￿nancing
will rely more on domestic revenue and additional external sources, including
on less concessional terms.￿ 11 However, the literature on the catalytic e⁄ects
of IMF lending indicates that being under under the continued tutelage of the
Fund could come at the cost of lower in￿ ows of such capital, thus at least delay-
ing the true graduation of these countries from aid dependence. Indeed, even
the Fund itself is concerned that it might stigmatize its clients (c.f. Box 1 in
IMF 2008). Thus, it is pertinent to ask whether the PSI certi￿es participants
as commercially creditworthy or brands them as lemons that should still be
con￿ned to receiving concessional ￿ ows.
To evaluate the potentially contradictory e⁄ects of a non-funded IMF pro-
gramme such as the PSI on ￿nancial ￿ ows from other sources, I extend and
adapt the model in Hagen (2009). The model is extended by adding aid donors
to evaluate the impact of gatekeeping and adapted to consider the implications
for a speci￿c programme of policy ￿certi￿cation￿ . 12 In section 2, I sketch the
components of the model. The results are presented in section 3. Section 4
contains my concluding comments.
2 Building Stones for Modelling the PSI
2.1 Preliminaries
There are four kinds of agents that need to be modelled in order to analyse the
PSI. Obviously, ￿rst of all there must be a poor member country that has made
a request to have its policies scrutinised in the context of the PSI. Secondly, and
equally obvious, the likely behaviour of the IMF must be investigated. Given the
Fund￿ s privileged access to the authorities of the member country and the threat
9The exceptions are Cape Verde and Nigeria. The other ￿ve have bene￿tted from the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initivative (MDRI) too.
10With the exception of Rwanda they also have the lowest concessionality requirements due
to their low risk of debt distress, c.f. Table 1 in IMF (2009b).
11P. 4, IMF Country Report 10/132.
12On the other hand the issue of the relative merits of multilateral lending and certi￿cation
that is the main focus of that paper is not considered here.
5of terminating a programme if the latter do not provide the information required,
I assume that the former acquires an informational advantage with respect to
the last two types of agents, private lenders and o¢ cial donors. Through its
statements about what it ￿nds during reviews the IMF might seek to relinquish
this advantage or to retain it.
Donors and commercial providers of ￿nance need to be included in the model
as their responses to the announcements of the IMF will in￿ uence the latter. As
noted above, donors might use the ￿certi￿cate￿issued by the IMF to determine
whether the country is more or less deserving of aid. This would only be a
normal extension of the Fund￿ s gatekeeping role with respect to macroeconomic
developments to a situation where it does not provide resources of its own. I
also pointed out that the countries with a PSI are interested in attracting pri-
vate foreign capital and that the Fund has indeed granted them more leeway
with respect to non-￿nancial borrowing than most other members that qualify
for concessional lending. Private lenders might change their decisions with re-
spect to lending to the country in question after digesting the IMF￿ s statement
about the potential borrower￿ s policies. I thus study their behaviour and how
it in￿ uences Fund decision-making as well. The timing of events is depicted in
Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
I ￿rst study the optimal behaviour of the member country, commercial
lenders, and aid donors (in that order). These results are prerequisites for
analysing what the IMF will do with the ￿ndings of its PSI reviews
2.2 The Member Country
To simplify the analysis as much as possible without leaving out anything of
essence for the results I assume that the country may be either of only two
types. Implicit in the PSI-approach is the notion that the Fund￿ s seal of approval
should enable programme countries to tap private capital ￿ ows to a greater case
than they can on their own. To see whether and when this is indeed the case
there needs to be some heterogeneity amongst countries that could request a
PSI. Two types of countries, with only one having the requisite characteristics
for being commercially creditworthy, are both necessary and su¢ cient for an
interesting analysis.
The ￿rst archtype is a country that is not truly a ￿mature stabiliser￿ , i.e.,
its policies still leaves something to be desired, especially with respect to being
commercially creditworthy. A country of this type should only receive aid,
if anything. The other archtype, however, although still poor, has economic
policies and an institutional framework in place that makes it safe for private
lenders to lend if they are fully aware of its true characteristics. More speci￿cally,
the supposed di⁄erence between the types H and L is that the former has
higher marginal returns to investment than the latter. This is a useful analytical
shortcut as the returns to investing in a country realistically depend on many
of the policies and institutional features that the IMF is supposed to assess in
its reviews under the PSI.
6The government of the borrower country chooses investment and interna-




where ’ is the discount factor. The budget constraints are
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Ii if default: (2b)
That is, in period 1 the country has some exogenous income Y1 and may
augment period 1 consumption (Ci
1) through international borrowing (Bi) at an
interest rate of ri or aid (Ai) and period 2 consumption (Ci
2) through investment
(Ii), with the values of these variables potentially depending on the kind of
equilibrium emerging as well as country type. If type i fully services its debt




I) are available for consumption
in period 2. If it defaults by paying creditors anything less than principal plus
interest it incurs the loss of a fraction of period 2 income ￿ 2 (0;1).13 As
already noted I assume ￿H > ￿L. This means that H have a higher capability
of servicing its debt than L other things being equal.
Given the linearity of the borrower￿ s objective function there are potentially
a large number of cases to consider. To focus on the most interesting and realistic
ones, I therefore make some assumptions on the main parameters such as the
rates of return, the discount rate of the government, and the penalty rate.14 The
assumptions ￿rst of all imply ￿H > ￿ > ￿L, i.e., that it is e¢ cient that only
the H-type invests if it is charged the risk-free interest rate ￿. They also imply
that the time-preferences of the sovereign are such that in fact only the H-type
invests, given no default. Moreover, given the linearity of the objective function
it invests all funds available: IH = Y1 +A+B. On the other hand, L might be
thought of as ￿truly￿not creditworthy as it will not invest even in the best of
circumstances, and instead, perhaps, as being a natural candidate for receiving
aid only. In sum the assumptions thus imply UL = CL
1 and UH = ’CH
2 .
2.3 Private lenders
In the market for sovereign debt depicted here, there are two types of market
failure. The ￿rst one is moral hazard. Ex post, a sovereign cannot be forced
to respect its obligations by legal means as there are no international courts
in which it can be sued. And despite legal changes over recent decades that
have done away with absolute sovereignity in the major creditor country courts,
the fact remains that it is hard to enforce verdicts favouring lenders, especially
13This assumption is common in the literature on sovereign debt, c.f. the review by Eaton
and Fernandez (1995).
14These assumptions are stated in the appendix together with the rest of the technicalities
behind the results derived here.
7when the sovereign is a poor one. Developing country governments rarely have
su¢ ciently valuable assets abroad that can be seized in such an event.15 The
result is credit rationing in equilibrium.
Secondly, here there is adverse selection. The bad type country should not
be given credit. It does not invest and so has no repayment capacity come
period 2. As we shall see the good type is able and willing to honour some debt
contracts. However, if the IMF does not provide reliable information beyond
that already possessed by private lenders the amount of credit and the terms
given will in equilibrium re￿ ect the risk that the borrower is a lemon.
The ex ante probability that lenders attach to i = L is p 2 (0;1). The
amount invested by the country is assumed to be unobservable to lenders. In
combination with the linearity of the objective function of the authorities, this
precludes the country from being a strategic player in the game and makes the
information provided by the IMF about its type crucial to the decisions of private
lenders.16 There are only pure-strategy equilibria in the game analysed here.
This means that either borrower type is revealed to lenders (in a separating
equilibrium) or they learn nothing and must go by their priors (in a pooling
equilibrium). In making their decisions they play Nash against donors, i.e.,
they take the level of aid the country receives as given.
With a strictly positive penalty rate, the critical value of debt at which
the borrower is indi⁄erent between servicing it and incurring the loss implied









Of course, it is never optimal for lenders to lend more than B
i
if the country￿ s
type is known. Therefore, in general the volume of lending is supply-determined
in this model. Lenders are risk-neutral and maximise expected pro￿ts, with the
risk-free rate of interest on the world market being their opportunity cost. I
make the standard assumption of a competitive market in the sense of no pro￿ts
in expectation. I also simplify by assuming that although losses are in￿ icted on
the borrower if it defaults lenders receive nothing. Denoting the probability of
default by ￿, the no-expected-pro￿ts condition is then




If the IMF￿ s intervention does not reveal new information to lenders, the
posterior probability that i = L equals p too. In a pooling equilibrium, lenders
are not able to distinguish the two types. Even though the H-type might be
willing to pay an interest rate higher than ￿ in order to get more credit, so is
15For more on the legal issues of sovereign debt, see e.g. Roubini and Setser (2004) and
Panizza et al. (2009).
16Acharya and Diwan (1993) have shown that a debtor buying back its debt might signal
its willingness to invest to creditors. To concentrate on the IMF￿ s strategic role I therefore
assume that the country￿ s initial debt is zero.
8L, which never invests and thus always defaults on any B > 0. Therefore the
two types can neither be screened nor signal their type. Hence, in a pooling
equilibrium lenders are con￿ned to o⁄ering terms that are not type-contingent.
B obviously will not be so high that both types prefer to default. On the other
hand, lending nothing would leave potential pro￿ts on the table since there is
a strictly positive probability that the country is of type H and thus will repay
some levels of debt given some risk-adjusted interest rates. This means that the
pooling equilibrium credit limit B
P
must be such that with certainty L defaults
and H repays the loan with interest. As thus ￿ = p, rP =
1+￿
1￿p ￿ 1 > ￿.
In a separating equilibrium, the IMF reveals the country￿ s type to the mar-
ket. Then lending no more than B
i
is risk-free, i.e., ￿ = 0. Due to competition





because IL = 0; if the country has low returns to investment it will be shut o⁄










(A) are increasing in the amount of aid a good type
receives in the two equilibria. As all aid is invested it increases the repayment
capacity of H and thus the credit limits it faces.17
In sum, lenders have only three responses in pure strategy equilibria: they





. These contracts, which are indexed by j, are illustrated in Figure 2.











1+￿ ; if i = H;
(5)
be ex post pro￿ts discounted by ￿ if the country of type i is given the
contract Dj, taking into account the fact that an L-type (H-type) always (never)
defaults. In combination with the linearity of the borrower￿ s objective function,
discounting pro￿ts by the lenders￿own opportunity cost makes it commensurate
with consumption in the capital-importing countries in the following sense: if a
unit of funds is borrowed but not repaid, borrower consumption increases by one
unit in period 1 without any reduction in period 2; while the period 2 decrease
in the consumption of lenders is ￿(1 + ￿), which is equal to ￿1 in terms of
period 1 consumption. Hence, in this way borrowers and lenders are treated
symmetrically in the model. This simpli￿es the analysis that follows.
2.4 Donors
Aid donors are assumed to care about consumption levels in the recipient coun-
try. However, their intertemporal preferences are not necessarily the same as
17For an analysis of the impact of aid on commercial credit from a di⁄erent perspective, see
Pedersen (2003).
9those of the authorities there. Moreover, giving aid is assumed to be costly.







where ￿ > 0 is the marginal cost of aid. Donors are assumed to have the
same priors over country type as private lenders. They will then also attach
the same posterior probability to the possibility that country type is L after
having heard the IMF￿ s speech as the latter do. Recalling that donors play
Nash against lenders, it is straightforward to ￿nd the optimal levels of grant-aid

















Note that the level of private lending does not a⁄ect the amount of aid given.
This is due to donors￿objective function being linear in consumption levels in
the developing country. In a more general fomulation, more private credit would
lead to a smaller grant. However, as this has no bearing on the results derived
here I prefer the simpler speci￿cation in (6).
It is easy to see that there is a critical value of donors￿discount factor that
result in AL = AP = AH. I will label it ￿
￿. For lower discount factors, a
member country that is not commercially creditworthy gets more aid than one
that have access international credit markets, contingent on types being known.
On the other hand, if donors put more weight on future outcomes than ￿
￿ the
type with low returns to investment gets less aid than the one with high returns.
￿ < ￿
￿ might seem like the most reasonable assumption to make. For one
thing, it generates a ￿natural￿division of labour between donors and lenders -
the former compensate the lemons for the lack of lending by the latter by giving
them more aid - that to some extent mimicks what we actually observe. More-
over, both theoretical and empirical studies strongly suggest that aid policies
are prone to being dynamically inconsistent due to various bureaucratic and
political failures.18 Ex ante donors might try to impose certain conditionalities
to be ful￿lled in order to receive aid, but ex post it often turns out to be the case
that these threats are not credible. For example, aid agencies are no di⁄erent
than other public agencies when it comes to disbursement pressures. Because
unused funds is often interpreted by bureauractic and political principals as a
18For theoretical analyses, see Hagen (2006), Martens et al. (2002). Pedersen (1996, 2001),
and Svensson (2000). On the record of multilateral conditionality, see e.g. Mosley et al.
(1991), Killick (1998), Dollar and Svensson (1998), Ivanova et al. (2003), and Easterly (2005).
10lack of ￿need￿ , agencies usually spend all funds available in a budget year.19
Thus, threatening a recalcitrant recipient government with withholding aid is
rarely credible.
The problem is often aggravated by political failure. An altruistic donor will
have a hard time ignoring need even if the magnitude of need is at least partly
due to recipients not having ful￿lled preconditions to which it has agreed. Thus,
this Samaritan￿ s Dilemma is another reason why, for example, empirical studies
￿nd rates of implementation of aid conditionalities to be rather poor. In the
current context, this literature can be broadly summarised as predicting that
￿lemons￿will be rewarded due to greater need, which is what the assumption
￿ < ￿
￿ implies.
However, over the last decade or so there has been much talk about improv-
ing aid by measures such as fostering ownership on the part of recipients and
allocating aid selectively to good performers. This rhetoric can be interpreted as
implying that donors will take a more long-term view and focus on supporting
those recipients that pursue policies conducive to developing their economies.
Indeed, there is some evidence that donors have become more selective.20 In
the model analysed here this can be captured by assuming ￿ > ￿
￿ so that
AH > AP > AL. Below, I study the consequences of both assumptions.
2.5 Resource Flows, Pro￿ts, and Welfare
It is time to summarise the analysis so far by calculating resource ￿ ows to the
developing country in di⁄erent equilibria as these determine the payo⁄s to the
other actors, which in turn feeds into the IMF￿ s objectives (considered in the
next section). The ￿rst step is to use the results on aid to calculate the level
of credit that the developing country will receive. Recalling that B
L
(A) = 0
and that donors and lenders will have the same posterior beliefs, this simply
amounts to inserting AH in B
H
(A) and AP in B
P
(A).





. In the absence of aid, the good type receives higher in￿ ows than the
bad type, with the pooling equilibrium level being in between. This re￿ ects the
fact that lenders are willing to lend to H-types but not to L-types. Naturally,
this ranking is preserved when AH > AP > AL as well as for ￿ close to ￿
￿.
However, for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ the lemon receives higher total ￿ ows in period 1 than the
good type for low enough values of the marginal cost of aid. In other words, if





Next, consider the levels of country welfare implied by the reactions of donors
and lenders to the news that the IMF provides. I denote the welfare of a
19If anything, the problem is magni￿ed in the sphere of aid by the broken feed-back loop from
ultimate bene￿ciaries (the poor in developing countries) to the ultimate donors (taxpayers in
rich countries), which tend to make outputs such as the amount spent the measuring rod for
performance instead of outcomes on the ground.
20See e.g. Dollar and Levin (2006) and Claessens et al. (2009).
11type i developing country that has been given contract a contract of type j by
commercial lenders and corresponding amounts of aid by Uij. A necessary and
su¢ cient condition for an L-type country at least weakly preferring separation
to being mistaken for the other type is FL
1 ￿ FH
1 . The logic is that as the bad
type does not invest it prefers to have foreign resource ￿ ows maximised. The
composition does not matter for L; loans are equivalent to grants because it
will not repay and, what is more, su⁄ers no costs from defaulting. On the other





are not also identical with respect to their components. The H-type will prefer
to have a smaller loan and more aid as it knows that it will ￿nd it optimal to
repay the loan with interest in period 2.
What about lenders? If the borrower is creditworthy, they prefer that the
IMF does not provide them with additional information. The logic behind this
somewhat surprising result is that when there is full information any pure pro￿ts
are competed away. On the other hand, if the IMF￿ s statement leaves lenders no
wiser than they were at the outset they will charge a risk-premium re￿ ecting the
possibility of the country not being creditworthy. Ex ante the premium is such
that expected pro￿ts are zero, but ex post lenders will either make pure pro￿ts
(if the country turns out to be of the good type) or lose money (if it is actually
a lemon). In a sense, the Fund can help lenders ￿collude￿if surveillance has
revealed i = H by keeping this knowledge secret, but it can also induce transfers
from them to the developing country by keeping them in the dark about the fact
that it is not creditworthy. If the country is a lemon, lenders￿ex post pro￿ts
are obviously maximised if the IMF reveals this fact.
2.6 The IMF
As noted I assume that before the borrower interact with lenders and donors
country type is revealed to the IMF. This may be thought of as the IMF con-
ducting a review that is completely accurate with respect to the value of ￿i.21
Of course, if this is a permanent feature of the country one would expect inter-
ested third-parties to learn its type as time goes by. However, circumstances
and policies change over time, so it is more fruitful to picture this parameter as
expressing the ￿current￿state of the member country.22
Upon concluding a PSI review the IMF makes a statement about its ￿ndings
that may signal what is then its private information to lenders. It chooses its
communication strategy to maximise a weighted average of the other agents￿
objective functions:
Wij = !Uij + ￿￿ij + (1 ￿ ! ￿ ￿)V ij; i = L;H;j = L;H;P; (8)
21It is of course unrealistic to assume that the IMF becomes as knowledgeable as the coun-
try￿ s authorities, but it is a useful simpli￿cation at this stage. Moreover, the results should
continue to hold as long as the IMF has an informational advantage over private lenders and
donors. Including information costs is left for future research.
22Admittedly, this formulation is somewhat awkward in a two-period model. However, the
important point is that the model is static, and considering the dynamics of this state variable
would take us too far a￿eld.
12where Uij, ￿ij, and V ij re￿ ect the results derived above, !;￿ 2 (0;1), and
! + ￿ ￿ 1. This objective function may be rationalised in the following way.
The interests of all other agents in the model are to some extent important to
the IMF. The purposes of the organisation set forth in its Articles of Agreement
re￿ ect the overarching objective of contributing to the welfare of its members.
Thus, U is a relevant argument of W. The importance of ￿ to the IMF might be
argued in several ways. For example, pro￿ts from commercial lending obviously
accrue to institutions in some member countries, contributing to their national
income. Also, the Fund is charged with maintaining the international ￿nancial
system. This means that is has to look after the interests of both sides of the
market. Similarly, in a dynamic perspective, the IMF must keep one eye on how
its actions impact on the bottom line of capital providers to retain credibility
with markets and thus being able to in￿ uence them.
The ful￿llment of donor objectives could also be seen as re￿ ective of the
pursuance of members￿interests. Moreover, in most poor countries the IMF
interact with bilateral aid agencies year in, year out. To maintain a working
relationship with them and preserve its problematic but status-conferring role
as gatekeeper with respect to accessing aid budgets, it needs to factor in the
goals of these actors when presenting its assessments of the macroeconomic
situation in a recipient.23 If the country in question is a client of an important
shareholder such as the US, this issue could take on added importance. However,
beyond certain hotspots like Iraq and Afghanistan geopolitics is generally of
lesser importance for aid allocation in the post Cold War era. This would
probably be an accurate description with respect to the current PSI countries
at least. In any case, the framework is ￿ exible enough to allow us to ignore the
donors￿goals (by setting ! + ￿ = 1), which is what I will actually do below
PSIs have a three-year duration. Reviews are to be conducted on a semi-
annual basis, and a PSI will automatically lapse if two consecutive reviews are
not completed. That is, if Fund sta⁄ two times in a row ￿nd reasons for not
granting the seal of approval, whether because policies are not up to the standard
(upper tranche conditionality) or because not enough high-quality information
has been provided by the authorities, the PSI will be terminated. This implies
that over the course of such a review cycle the Fund can send four sequences of
messages. It can give the thumbs up twice in a row, in principle signalling that
this is a country with a sound policy framework. Or it can withdraw its en-
dorsement both times, thus certainly leaving the impression that the member￿ s
policies are seriously lacking in quality. Finally, it can mix yes and no, in both
cases sending no clear message to outside parties about the member.
23Both the latter argument as well as the argument about the need for maintaining a
reputation with capital market participants are really arguments about the Fund￿ s long-term
incentives. In a static model like the current one, however, they can be usefully be taken as
arguments for including the objectives of these actors amongst those that are more narrowly
the IMF￿ s own goals.
133 Equilibrium Reviews of a PSI
3.1 Cheap Talk Equilibria
The PSI can be thought of as giving rise to a game of ￿cheap-talk￿between
the IMF and donors and lenders, where the latter update their beliefs about
a participating country after thinking through the Fund￿ s incentives to make
truthful statements. By de￿nition, cheap-talk does not directly a⁄ect pay-o⁄s.
In the current context the only way in which certi￿cation by the IMF can have
an impact is by changing the beliefs of third-parties about country type, thereby
inducing them to change their o⁄ers.
The applicable equilibrium concept for this type of game is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE behaviour is rational given beliefs, with Bayes￿
Rule determining beliefs along the equilibrium path. As is well-known, there are
usually more than one PBE. I adopt the approach to re￿ning the equilibrium set
of messages advocated by Farrell (1993). That is, I assume i) all agents share
a common language and ii) this language is ￿rich￿ . The common language
assumption implies that the literal meaning of any message is clear, so that
incentives to deceive are the only barriers to communication. The rich language
assumption does two things. It rules out the so-called ￿babbling￿equilibrium
in which donors and lenders treat all statements as containing no information
and therefore go by their priors, in turn making it equilibrium behaviour for
the Fund to send all possible messages with the same positive probability. As
there are no unused messages, there is no way we can check the plausibility of
this equilibrium by studying what would happen if something that goes unsaid
in equilibrium suddenly was stated (an out-of equilibrium message was sent),
which is the standard way of re￿ning PBE. But Farrell (1993: 518) notes that the
babbling equilibrium is not very plausible: ￿It requires [the sender] to randomize
extensively, saying some very unnatural things, not for his own sake but for
the sake of equilibrium.￿ 24 The rich language assumption does away with this
uninteresting candidate equilibrium by always allowing for some other way of
saying anything.
This opens for a certain way of re￿ning the set of equilibria. More speci￿cally,
I apply Farrel￿ s (1993) concept of neologism-proofness when this is necessary to
sharpen the predictions. This works as follows. Suppose there is an out-of-
equilibrium message (a neologism) with the literal meaning, say, ￿the country
is of type H￿ . This neologism is ￿self-signalling￿if and only if the IMF would
like donors and lenders to believe this statement only when it is true. Then,
an equilibrium in which this statement is not made is not neologism-proof if
the IMF has an incentive to use it (i.e., is better o⁄ than in the purported
equilibrium if the message is sent and believed).
With this prerequisite in place, there are essentially only three meanings that
the IMF can communicate to third-parties in a pure-strategy PBE, to which I
without loss of generality con￿ne attention. Besides ￿the country is L￿and ￿the
country is H￿ , the IMF may not convince lenders and donors that either is true,
24A similar critiscism is voiced in Farrell and Rabin (1996).
14leaving them to go by their priors. The last case is equivalent to making the
statement ￿(N)o comment.￿This message may be seen as shorthand for all kinds
of uninformative statements. I therefore assume that the possible messages are
L, H, and N and that in all pooling PBE the IMF says N. The latter assumption
implies that there are always neologisms available even though I restrict the size
of the message space.25 These three messages H, L, and N correspond fairly
closely to the meaning conveyed by two consecutive PSI reviews: H is equivalent
to two successful reviews, L to two times non-completion, and N to one reviewed
being concluded and the other not.
3.2 Two Benchmarks
To limit the length of the paper I assume !+￿ = 1 in the following. The IMF￿ s
objective function (8) then reduces to Wij = !Uij +(1 ￿ !)￿ij. After a review
revealing i = L we thus have
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One angle on the results derived below follows from assuming that the coun-
terfactual is no IMF programme. This is the benchmark used in Hagen (2009).
Third-parties then have to go by their priors and ￿rst period capital ￿ ows will
be FP
1 = AP +B
P
. The country repays its debt with interest if it is truly com-
mercially creditworthy and reneges on the contract otherwise. Hence, lenders
lose money if the IMF member is a lemon. On the other hand, they earn pure
pro￿ts if the country is of the good type.
No IMF programme is perhaps the counterfactual that puts the e⁄ects of the
PSI in starkest relief. However, it is not the only one. A second useful bench-
mark for the analysis that follows is the case of no aid, which was investigated
25If pooling at L or H was allowed for, I would have to change the message space when
investigating whether such PBE are neologism-proof to maintain the possibility of the IMF
literally stating, say, that the review revealed i = H (as a pooling equilibrium statement H
would then convey the meaning ￿no comment￿). As noted, Farrell (1993) also assumes that
neologisms are always available.
15in Hagen (2009). There is then a critical value of ! equal to 0:5 such that for
lower (higher) values of the weight on country welfare in the IMF￿ s objective
function the unique neologism-proof PBE is separating (pooling).26 This is in
the spirit of cheap-talk games as it shows that in order for the quilibrium to be
informative the interests of senders and receivers of messages need to be su¢ -
ciently aligned. In this particular case, the sender is the IMF and lenders are
the receivers. Thus, lenders only believe the Fund￿ s statement about borrower
country type if they know that it places a su¢ ciently high weight on their in-
terests, i.e., pro￿ts. The intuition behind the critical value being 0:5 is that as
the bad type neither invests nor repays debts, a loan is a pure transfer in this
event. Given the linearity of its objective function, the Fund is only indi⁄erent
to a transfer from creditors to debtors being made if it places equal weight on
country welfare and lenders￿pro￿ts.27 If the IMF cares less (more) about the
borrower than its creditors it will (not) make a trutful statement after having
learned that i = L.
There is also a pooling PBE for ! < 0:5, but it is not neologism-proof as
the IMF wants to tell the truth if the country is a lemon and does not want to
make lenders believe it is not creditworthy if it is in fact so. Thus, if the out-
of-equilibrium message L is made, lenders should realise that it is true.28 And
if they do, the IMF will speak the truth when the country is not creditworthy.
This breaks the pooling equilibrium.
In other words, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium to
be informative is that regardless of what the review reveals the IMF does not
want to fool third-parties:
WLL ￿ WLH; (11a)
WHH ￿ WHL: (11b)
If these conditions do not hold, the equilibrium cannot be separating and
lenders as well as donors will learn nothing from when the result of the review
is made public. Their decisions will then be guided by their priors.
3.3 Results
If aid levels are very high and heavily skewed in favour of the type of country
that is not creditworthy, the equilibrium statement made by the IMF cannot be
informative. The IMF will not be able to make a truthful statement and have
it believed as both lenders and donors know that it has an incentive to portray
the member country in the way that maximises aid ￿ ows. This holds regardless
26C.f. Proposition 2.
27The normalisation in (5) contributes to the cleanliness of the result, but obviously does
not a⁄ect it qualitatively.
28That is, as WLL > WLP and WHL < WHP for such low values of !, the neologism L is
self-signalling.
16of the relative weighting of country welfare and pro￿ts in the institution￿ s ob-
jective function. In such a case, the PSI is not working according to intention.
Outcomes are the same whether an eligible member is in the programme or not.
The second benchmark provides a perspective on how a non-￿nancial pro-
gramme like the PSI works in an aid-dependent country when donors are heavily
focused on needs. It then becomes apparent that the IMF￿ s seal of approval can
be rendered worthless in such circumstances. Without aid, the Fund￿ s statement
will be informative as long as it puts no more relative weight on country welfare
than 50%. When much larger amounts of aid go to countries that are not com-
mercially creditworthy, the IMF will be tempted to play down the possibilities
for tapping commercial ￿nance for members that actually have them so as to
avoid a disproportionate drop in concessional ￿ ows. Hence, in this case one
could by extension argue that the PSI works perversely by reducing commercial
￿ ows and leaving creditworthy members dependent on the aid ￿ ows that are
currently the main component of inward capital ￿ ows for them. While this is in
their short-run interest, it is most likely not the best development strategy in
the longer run. Moreover, as lenders will get their ￿ngers burnt by lending pos-
itive amounts to lemons when aid clouds the picture there is a possibility that
the mature stabilisers￿graduation from aid dependence could also be delayed
by the supply-side￿ s unwillingness to engage with such countries.
For less generous aid ￿ ows that satisfy AH < AL, there exists a critical value
of ! such that the equilibrium is separating for lower values of this parameter
and there is pooling for higher values. In other words, in this region we obtain
qualitatively the same results as in Hagen (2009). Compared to a situation with
no IMF programme, the PSI thus potentially enables mature stabilisers to access
international credit markets. This goal is achieved if the objectives governing
the review process do not favour poor member countries too much. Furthermore,
quantitatively the critical value !￿ is higher than in the second benchmark: with
modest aid ￿ ows targeted at low-productivity economies, !￿ > 0:5. That is, the
space for separation is enlarged and the space for pooling is reduced compared to
the e⁄ects of IMF certi￿cation in a member not receiving aid. This is due to aid
￿ ows weakening the incentive to mimick when i = L without generating one for
i = H. At ￿rst glance it seems that in these circumstances gatekeeping works as
well as it can. However, the welfare e⁄ects are not necessarily straightforward
as the bad type loses when the good member country gains.
When ￿ > ￿
￿ it is only the preferences of the IMF that matters for the
degree of informativeness of the equilibrium. However, then !￿ < 0:5. The
intuition for this result is perhaps best illustrated by considering the special
case of ￿ = ￿
￿. Then the same amount of aid is given whether the equilibrium





Because only relative pay-o⁄s matter this implies that !￿ = 0:5, as is apparent
from (9a) and (9b). When the review is of no consequence for the amount of aid
provided, the trade-o⁄ is the same as in the case without aid. Hiding the fact
that the country is not commercially creditworthy by stating the opposite would
if the strategy was successful saddle lenders with a loss of ￿1 in period 1 terms
17for a gain of one unit of period 1 consumption for the country. As noted above,
the Fund can only be indi⁄erent to e⁄ecting such a transfer if !￿ = 0:5. It is
then easily seen that once donors give more aid to more productive recipients,
the IMF would have an incentive to conceal the true results of a review showing
i = L even if it weighs country welfare and pro￿ts equally. Thus, !￿ must
be lower than 0:5 in this case. The comparison with the ￿rst benchmark is
unpeturbed in the sense that there are values of !￿ such that the equilibrium
is separating, highlighting the potential of a PSI to be informative of country
characteristics of relevance to both donors and lenders. However, compared to
the second benchmark we see that now the gatekeeping role of the IMF actually
reduces the possibility that its seal of approval is valuable to third-parties.
3.4 Discussion
In sum, the consequences of the IMF signalling to two distinct audiences - com-
mercial lenders and aid donors - produce complex e⁄ects. In the worst-case
scenario, the gatekeeping role eliminates the IMF￿ s potential for helping lenders
distinguish creditworthy countries from lemons. Then credit-market access is
hindered and aid-dependency perpetuated. In the best case, aid supports sig-
nalling to credit markets by compensating member countries that are not com-
mercially creditworthy. By enlarging the space for separating the good and
the bad, donors increase the likelihood that the IMF facilitates the provision
of private ￿nance to mature stabilisers. In the intermediate case, selective aid
paradoxically weakens the prospects of achieving this goal by aggravating the
consequences of being branded a lemon. While still potentially better than no
arrangement with the Fund, in this scenario PSI participants do worse than a
member country in a corresponding certi￿cation process receiving no aid.
Both in the intermediate case and in the best-case scenario the ultimate
determinant of outcomes is the IMF￿ s relative weighting of country welfare and
pro￿ts. There are four reasons why one can expect the IMF to put great em-
phasis on the welfare of the country having requested a PSI (i.e., ! being fairly
large). First of all, eligible members are poor. From a normative perspective it
is thus justi￿able that the consequences of the IMF￿ s actions on their welfare
are given due weight. The Fund has also put considerable e⁄ort into revamping
its facilities for low-income countries, suggesting that it certainly take its role
in this part of the membership seriously.
Secondly, the systemic consequences of neglecting the impact on providers
of capital are small. Given the poverty of the potential borrowers, the sums
lent will in any case be small. Hence, the IMF do not have to worry whether
any losses to lenders will have wider repercussions on the global economy. This
probably also implies that the usual political pressures from major shareholders
on Fund decision-making does not apply.29
Thirdly, although not without precursors (albeit more informal), this is a
new arrangement. While the IMF could apply strict rules to signal that the
29For recent reviews of the political economy of the IMF, see Bird (2007) and Steinwand
and Stone (2008).
18PSI is supposed to be a mechanism for establishing beyond doubt the high
quality of policies and institutions in participating members, it would seem
more reasonable to expect some initial slacking of standards to increase demand.
The institution￿ s history is replete with examples of facilities being created and
abolished after hardly having been used, the Contingent Credit Line being only
the most recent one. The Fund would be embarrassed if it turned out that it has
spent resources developing yet another service for which there are no customers,
even if its own ￿nancial position right now is less precarious than it has been in
recent years.
Finally, the organisation is in general reluctant to explicitly criticise its mem-
bers, which after all are the principals of the international bureaucrats sta¢ ng
it. As noted in IMF (2004: 34-35), there are two main reasons why the Fund
tends to avoid critiscism: ￿First, the Fund fears that negative signals would
undermine the frankness of its dialogue with the authorities. Second, the Fund
is concerned that negative signals could bring serious negative consequences for
the member: in a country with access to capital markets, they could trigger the
very crisis the Fund would be seeking to avert; and in an aid-recipient country,
they could lead to a sharp reduction in foreign ￿nancing.￿This could be con-
strued as a revealed preference for sending muddled signals. The formal analysis
in this paper then demonstrates that the admirable goal of facilitating access
for PSI participants to international capital markets might not attainable with-
out changing the Fund￿ s own incentive structures. It also highlights how the
institution￿ s operations is inexorably linked with the behaviour of aid donors
in the countries in question. The Fund has been under considerable pressure
in recent years to allow the ￿scaling-up￿of aid to help achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. At the same time a somewhat greater proportion of bi-
lateral aid is being given in the form of budget-support, which is potentially
sensitive to the IMF￿ s portrayal of members￿policies. To evaluate the impact
of the gatekeeping role on the signal sent to commercial lenders - and thus the
prospects of any particular PSI arrangement - is admittedly not an easy task.
But especially at a time of ￿nancial crisis it is easy to believe that the IMF is
tempted to put the gloss on its reviews in order to keep aid ￿ owing even if this
might come at the cost of worsened prospects for attracting commercial ￿nance
to PSI participants.
The only indication in favour of the best case being the relevant one that I
can see is the fact that most countries that have already had a PSI have signed a
second agreement, the special case of Nigeria being the only exception. Mozam-
bique, Senegal, and Tanzania even did so after having been temporarily back in
￿nancial arrangements (with programmatic contents determined by their PSIs).
It could thus be that these so-called mature stabilisers see the PSI as a useful
half-way house on their way to graduation from aid, allowing the IMF to keep
aid ￿ owing while at the same time signalling to commercial actors that they
are not basket cases in need of its subsidised credits anymore. However, why
rejecting cheap loans while accepting grants should signal commercial creditwor-
thiness remain unclear, especially as Hagen (2009) shows that subsidised IMF
credit achieves more separation than mere certi￿cation. And even if accessing
19the Fund￿ s concessional facilities is stigmatizing in some other way, it is unclear
why it is the money that stains and not the conditionality, which is the same as
for the PSI. Indeed, the discussion of stigma in IMF (2008) only lists possible
reasons for not approaching the Fund, not why some of its services or products
might be more stigmatizing than others.
4 Conclusion: Certi￿ed or Branded?
The question motivating this paper is whether a certi￿cation mechanism such as
the PSI can work in countries still highly dependent on aid or will only serve to
brand them as not yet ready to enter commercial credit markets. The theoretical
model does not present a clear-cut answer. It shows that there are instances
where the scale and pro￿le of aid allocations combine with the IMF￿ s objectives
to both allow more information to be transmitted to third-parties compared
to no arrangement at all and to raise the potential for IMF communication to
be more informative than in a hypothetical case where participants receive no
aid. However, I would argue that the odds are stacked against such outcomes
being realised. There are organisational imperatives that work at cross-purposes
with the aim of facilitating access to non-concessional ￿nance for the mature
stabilisers the mechanism is aimed at: promoting the new service as well as the
￿do-no-harm￿culture censoring negative signals. The systemic consequences are
small as well: here we are talking about Tanzania, not Thailand, Mozambique,
not Mexico. Finally, eligible members have low incomes and remain dependent
on aid. Given the conventional behaviour of donors, this is likely to imply that
each signal has both positive and negative consequences. Being branded a lemon
could mean being certi￿ed as needy; conversely, being certi￿ed as creditworthy
could mean being branded as unworthy of receiving aid. It is then entirely
plausible that giving due weight to the short- to medium-term interests of PSI-
countries the IMF should make sure concessional funds keep ￿ owing, even if
this results in the commercial credit that its richer members rely on remaining
unavailable. The case for the PSI rests on the continued demand for the service
by those that have experience with it, as well as indications of demand from
other countries in a similar position. This is not fool-proof evidence for the
theoretical best case being the applicable one, as participants could merely be
trying to escape a perceived stigma of accessing the IMF￿ s concessional facilities.
But the defence could use it to argue that the jury is still out on the weaker
proposition that the PSI is a useful addition to the Fund￿ s tool kit for low-income
members.
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To ￿nd optimal aid policies, recall that CL
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21The results stated in equations (7a ￿ c) in the main text thus follows. As
￿￿ < 0, the second-order conditions are satis￿ed in all three cases. The rela-
tive volumes of aid depend on ￿ R ￿
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The following results can then be deduced:
Lemma A1
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Proof of Lemma A1:











This expression is negative at ￿ = ￿
￿. Given the maintained assumptions
on parameter values it is positive for ￿ = 0. Moreover, b ￿ can be seen to be
monotonically declining in ￿. Hence 9b ￿ 2 (0;￿
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Since the marginal cost of aid is positive, FH
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i) A necessary and su¢ cient condition for an L-type country at least weakly
preferring separation to being mistaken for the other type is FL
1 ￿ FH
1 .
ii) A necessary but not su¢ cient condition for an H-type country at least
weakly preferring separation to being mistaken for the other type is FL
1 ￿ FH
1 .
Proof of Lemma A2:
Part i): ULL = Y1 + FL
1 and ULH = Y1 + FH
1 . Hence, ULL ￿ ULH ,
FL
1 ￿ FH


























, there exists b b ￿ > b ￿ such that ￿ ￿ b b ￿ , UHL ￿
UHH. For ￿ ￿ b b ￿, UHL ￿ UHH.
Proof of Corollary A1:











Parameter Assumption I, the right-hand side is a constant in (0;1). The left-
hand side goes to zero as ￿ goes to 1. When ￿ goes to zero, the left-hand side
becomes
￿






￿(1 + ￿H)￿ (1 + ￿H)
b b ￿ is de￿ned by equating this expression with the right-hand side. As the
limit is non-positive for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, b b ￿ < ￿
￿. It is also easily checked that b b ￿ > b ￿.
Moreover, since this limit of the left-hand side is monotonically decreasing in ￿
the result follows. Intuitively, b b ￿ > b ￿ as aid ￿ ows must be smaller to render the
good type indi⁄erent between being labelled L or H due to the costs associated
with commercial borrowing. This can also be veri￿ed by explicitly deriving the
expression for b b ￿. QED.
Lemma A3
￿HP > ￿LL = ￿HH = ￿HL = 0 > ￿LP > ￿LH.
Proof of Lemma A3:
If i = H, but lenders do not know it, (5) in the main text show that dis-
counted ex post pro￿ts are positive due to the risk-premium charged. If type is
revealed competition leads to zero pro￿ts as rH = ￿. Pro￿ts are obviously also
zero if lenders mistake H for L and lends nothing. On the other hand, if i = L,
but lenders are unaware of this fact they will also charge rH > ￿. However, as
the bad type repays nothing, lenders will lose money ex post. Of course, they
will lose even more if they mistakenly believe it is the good type. This contrasts
with the zero expected and actual pro￿ts realised when lenders know the coun-
try is a lemon and thus lends nothing. In sum, if the borrower is creditworthy,
lenders prefer that the IMF does not provide them with additional information.
However, if the country is a lemon, lenders￿ex post pro￿ts are maximised if the
IMF reveals this fact. QED.
Proposition A1
There exists a set of parameters
￿







, a) ￿ < b b ￿, the equilibrium is pooling; b) ￿ ￿ b b ￿, the equilibrium
is separating for ! ￿ !￿ and pooling for ! > !￿;
ii) ￿ ￿ b b ￿, the equilibrium is separating for ! ￿ !￿ and pooling for ! > !￿.
Proof of Proposition A1:
When the country is commercially creditworthy, lenders will never lose money.
The IMF￿ s optimal message is then the one that maximises country welfare. By
23Corrollary A1, for ￿ < b b ￿ and ￿ < b b ￿ the IMF wants to deceive lenders when
i = H. Thus, its statement cannot be informative in equilibrium. This proves
part ia). To prove parts ib) and ii), we must consider the IMF￿ s incentives when
i = L. Then lenders will lose money if borrower country type is not revealed
to them, whereas the lemon will gain (C.f. Lemma A3). Comparing (9a) and
(9b) in the main text, one can derive the critical value !￿from WLL ￿ WLH. If
! > !￿ (! < !￿), the IMF would (not) like the country to gain at the expense
of lenders. Thus, the Fund will optimally tell the truth for both i = L and







; ￿ = ￿
￿, !￿ = 1







Proof of Corollary A2:














+ AH ￿ AL
:
By Corollary A1, b b ￿ > b ￿. Thus, by Lemma A1 FH
1 > FL
1 for ￿ ￿ b b ￿ and so
!￿ < 1. From the same results it also follows that FH
1 > FL
1 for ￿ ￿ b b ￿. We
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27Table 1: Current status of countries having entered a PSI-programme 
Country  Date of approval  Current status 
Cape Verde  July 31, 2006  8
th review completed. 1-year extension in preparation 
for 2
nd 3-year programme granted June 19, 2009. 
Second PSI (15 months) approved November 22, 2010 
Mozambique  June 18, 2007  Entered 1-year ESF-arrangement June 30, 2009. 
Second PSI approved June 14, 2010, 1
st review 
completed. 
Nigeria October  17,  2005  4
th and final review completed 
Rwanda  June 16, 2010  No reviews completed yet 
Senegal  November 2, 2007  6
th review completed. Entered ESF-arrangement 
December 19, 2008 (extended from 12 to 18 months). 
Second PSI approved December 3, 2010. 
Tanzania  February 16, 2007  First PSI extended when entering 1-year ESF-
arrangement May 29, 2009. Second PSI approved June 
4, 2010, 1
st review completed.  
Uganda  December 15, 2006  7
th review completed. 1-year extension in preparation 
for 2
nd 3-year programme granted December 21, 2009. 
Second PSI approved May 12, 2010. 
Note: The Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF) was renamed the Standby Credit Facility in 
January 2010 as part of the IMF’s revamping of its menu of programmes for LICs. However, 
ongoing ESF programmes will continue until they expire or are otherwise terminated. 
Source: IMF country reports and press releases. 
 



















































L   () A B
P  Certi￿ed or Branded? A Game-Theoretic




While often considered a purely ￿nancial institution, the IMF has
throughout its history performed non-￿nancial services for its member-
ship. The latest such example is the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), a
certi￿cation mechanism established in 2005 for which only poor members
are eligible. Based on a formal game-theoretic model, I argue that it is
unlikely that the PSI will serve well its intended goal of facilitating capital
market access for members requesting the service. Their low income, the
lack of signi￿cant consequences for markets, the IMF￿ s traditional reluc-
tance to criticise members, as well as the need to promote the use of the
new arrangement indicate that the Fund could emphasise participants￿
welfare over the interests of private lenders. The continued importance of
foreign aid in eligible countries also puts the IMF in the role of gatekeeping
such ￿ ows, which might con￿ ict with sending clear signals to commercial
actors. All these reasons imply that in many cases its seal of approval
will be of little use to third-parties, despite the high standards to which
PSI-countries are supposed to adhere. The best argument in favour of the
PSI being a useful addition to the Fund￿ s tool kit for low-income members
is the fact that several countries have already signed a second one.
JEL: F33, F34, F35.
Keywords: IMF, signalling, international lending, foreign aid.
1 Introduction
The IMF serves many functions, but it seems fair to say that the main focus
has been on the ￿nancial services it provides. While noting that surveillance
activities account for 42% of the IMF￿ s budget, Bordo and James (2000: 9)
claim that ￿[t]he IMF is primarily a ￿nancial institution.￿There is some merit
in this view, but it might obscure the fact that the Fund has always provided
￿I am happy to acknowledge the helpful comments of participants at a seminar at NTNU
(Trondheim).
yDepartment of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckels gate 14, 5007 Bergen, Nor-
way. Phone/fax: +47 55589219 / 55589210. E-mail: Rune.Hagen@econ.uib.no.
1many non-￿nancial services to its members. Indeed, some argue that the need
for multilateral surveillance is the very reason for the existence of the IMF
(GuitiÆn 1992: 12): ￿There is a well-de￿ned common thread that binds together
all the activities of the IMF: the promotion and safeguarding of an international
code of conduct. [...] The IMF is primarily a surveillance institution, and
its other activities derive their legitimacy from the surveillance mandate laid
out in the Articles of Agreement.￿Surveillance of members is carried out on
a regular basis, usually yearly, in what is known as Article IV consultations.
In the process, the IMF gathers an enormous amount of information about the
economy of each member as well as the policies of the government. Similar
processes take place in the context of negotiations of ￿nancial arrangements
with members. In addition, the IMF continually monitors and analyses the
economies of members. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the IMF
has an informational advantage vis-a-vis third-parties when it comes to the state
they are in (Rodrik 1996, Hagen 2009).
It is also the case that throughout its history the IMF has deliberated on
the impressions its actions convey to non-members. This includes signals sent
in the context of standard ￿nancial arrangements (e.g. whether or not to grant
a member￿ s request for access to resources beyond those semi-automatically
available to all members) and precautionary facilities (where a member obtains
an option to draw on the Fund only if speci￿c events occur), but also in a
long list of more or less ad-hoc non-￿nancial mechanisms.1 Most of the latter
can be described as certi￿cation devices, where the IMF makes public claims
about certain aspects of economic conditions and policies in member countries.
These mechanisms have been considered problematic for various reasons, such
as the (lack of) clarity as to what they signal or their low dimensionality. For
example, simple endorsements of the policies of a member only tell third-parties
whether the programme is on track or not according to a standard, not the
extent to which it is on or o⁄-track or in what areas. Moreover, the standards
used have not always been explicit, creating confusion as to the value of the seal
of approval.
The IMF￿ s latest mechanism of certi￿cation is called the Policy Support
Instrument (PSI), and was approved by the Executive Board in October 2005.2
The PSI is aimed at the poorer members, mostly low-income countries (LICs).3
1See the excellent discussion of the pros and cons of various mechanisms for signalling the
private information of the Fund to outsiders without committing ￿nancial resources, including
those that are defunct or never made it past the proposal-stage, in IMF (2004).
2See IMF (2005a) as well as Policy Support Instrument - Framework, Decision No. 13561-
(05/85), as amended. The PSI framework was slightly revised in connection with the revamp-
ing of the Fund￿ s concessional facilities in January 2010, c.f. A New Architecture of Facilities
for Low-Income Countries and Reform of the Fund￿ s Concessional Financing Framework, De-
cision No. 14385-(09/79).
3More speci￿cally, the board has stated that the PSI is open to all members eligible for
assistance under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, provided that they: ￿(a) have a
policy framework focused on consolidating macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability,
while deepening structural reforms in key areas in which growth and poverty reduction are
constrained; and (b) seek to maintain a close policy dialogue with the Fund, through the
Fund￿ s endorsement and assessment of their economic and ￿nancial policies [...].￿
2It is expected to be a service to so-called ￿mature stabilisers￿ , i.e., countries
having achieved a modicum of macroeconomic stability allowing them the leeway
to eschew Fund-￿nancing. The Fund argues that even though these have in a
sense graduated from its concessional credit facilities, they might still want
its approval of their policies. While such countries are of course subject to
regular Article IV surveillance, the PSI will provide an explicit endorsement as
well as more frequent assessments of a member￿ s policies. In contrast to the
compulsory nature of Article IV surveillance the PSI is supposed to be demand-
driven. So far, six countries (see Table 1) - Cape Verde, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda - have some experience with a PSI, with the
Fund claiming interest from other members as well.4 The current ￿nancial crisis
might have dampened this interest somewhat. However, it is noteworthy that
while three of the ￿ve countries with an ongoing PSI have found it necessary to
access IMF money, Cape Verde and Uganda did not. Moreover, Mozambique,
Senegal, and Tanzania are all back on the PSI only and Rwanda has recently
become the seventh member to request and have a PSI approved. This indicates
that the crisis has not viped out the demand for a non-￿nancial programme of
this type. One can therefore expect the PSI to continue into the near future at
least.
[Table 1 about here]
A natural question to ask is why these LICs prefer a PSI programme to a
funded one.5 The standards to which they are supposed to adhere in order to
gain the Fund￿ s approval - upper tranche conditionality - are the same. And
they still qualify for concessional funding. It is true that the subsidy in IMF
concessional lending is small compared to both IDA (much longer repayment pe-
riod) and much of the bilateral aid they receive (nowadays mostly 100% grants).
But as many of the PSI-programme countries seek nonconcessional funding (see
below) this cannot be the main argument for eschewing the opportunity to bor-
row from the Fund. It thus seems reasonable to venture that there must be
a di⁄erence in the type of signal the IMF sends to third-parties after having
evaluated the policies of a LIC member with a lending programme and one
with a PSI. Indeed, in the few academic papers dealing with the PSI one ￿nds
two opposing views. Bevan (2009) and Taylor (2006) are of the opinion that
non-funded programmes provide a stronger signal with respect to the quality
of economic policies by clarifying who is responsible for them and eliminating
a potential con￿ ict of interest for the Fund, which in the event that a member
country is already indebted to it would bene￿t from any catalytic e⁄ect of its
4According to Taylor (2006: 386): ￿[A] series of requests for this type of program from
the ￿nance ministers of HIPCs in Africa was what ￿rst put this idea on the reform agenda
[...]￿The IMF itself conducted surveys of both LIC-members as well as other stakeholders in
connection with both the initial decision as well as the ￿rst review of the PSI (IMF 2005b,
2009a). These surveys provide some support for there being such a demand. However, the
independent survey by Martin et al. (2009) paints a more sanguine picture.
5Cape Verde is currently classi￿ed as a lower middle-income country by the World Bank,
but falls under the exception of ￿small island economies.￿ For the sake of simplicity I will
sometimes speak of PSI-eligible IMF members as LICs, though there are potential and actual
exceptions to this rule like Cape Verde.
3seal of approval on ￿nancing from other sources.6 Building on an argument ￿rst
made by Rodrik (1996), Lane (2009) argues to the contrary: that the IMF has
a greater incentive to monitor policies when its own money is at stake. Being
better informed in this case, its seal of approval should convey a stronger signal.
In Hagen (2009) I investigated this issue and found that lending is not a nec-
essary condition for informative communication by the IMF. However, putting
its money where its mouth is enables the Fund to credibly reveal its private
information to third-parties in cases where mere certi￿cation does not.
With the PSI, the question of when the IMF￿ s signal has a greater e⁄ect on
other ￿nancial ￿ ows can in principle be addressed by data. However, while the
Fund has conducted its ￿rst review of experience with the PSI (IMF 2009a),
there are still too few data points to allow ￿rm conclusions to be drawn. So
for the moment we have to do with related work on the impact of ￿nancial
programmes. Bird and Rowlands (1997) contains a good discussion of the issues
as well as a summary of earlier empirical studies of the catalytic e⁄ect of IMF
lending. The more recent review of this literature by Cottarelli and Ginannini
(2002) supports their conclusion that it is weak. It is noteworthy, though,
that the average seems to be masking two opposing e⁄ects, a negative one on
private commercial ￿ ows and a positive one on o¢ cial ￿ ows.7 The latter is
probably related to the ￿gatekeeping￿ role highlighted as problematic by the
Fund￿ s own Independent Evaluation O¢ ce in its ￿rst report (IEO 2002). An
IMF programme has been a prerequisite for debt relief in the context of the Paris
Club and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). In addition,
both bilateral and multilateral donors have frequently viewed them as providing
the necessary quality control of the macroeconomic policies of aid recipients.8
Bird and Rowlands (2007) present recent econometric evidence to the e⁄ect
that the IMF thereby actually increases aid ￿ ows to poor member countries. As
argued by Radelet (2006) and Taylor (2006), for example, lending to perform
this role has had unfortunate consequences such as tying up IMF resources
that could have been better used in member countries with a real balance of
payments need, increasing the debt levels of members only seeking the IMF￿ s
seal of approval, and too much focus on stabilisation where the macroeconomic
situation has signi￿cantly improved. The PSI severs the connection between
IMF money and certi￿cation, providing a signal to the aid donors of the mature
stabilisers without these negative sidee⁄ects.
When it comes to private ￿ ows, ￿ve of the seven countries that have signed
6This is a variation on the theme that aid donors in general engage in defensive lending
(or granting) to avoid defaults by recipients on the debt they owe them. For more detail as
well as some indicative empirical results, see Birdsall et al. (2003) and Marchesi and Missale
(2007).
7Other studies look at these issues from somewhat di⁄erent angles. Gelos et al. (2008) and
Thomas (2009) analyse what factors give poor countries access to private capital markets. The
former ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of IMF programmes once the quality of policies is controlled
for, whereas the latter ￿nd that in contrast to IDA-eligible countries the market access of IDA
graduates is positively a⁄ected by the time spent in IMF programmes.
8According to Fraser and Whit￿eld (2009: 86), this praxis persists.
4a PSI so far are post-completion-point HIPCs.9 This means that their pro-
grammes have contained caps on non-concessional borrowing, as the creditors
that have provided debt relief seek to guard against free-riding by other po-
tential lenders and prevent a reemergence of debt distress. Even though the
PSI-countries have been given some room to contract new debt on such terms,
in contrast to most other HIPCs,10 the caps have been a continuous source of
contention in their negotiations with the IMF. If their performance holds up,
it is likely that they will be given even more space to court private commer-
cial sources of ￿nancing, particularly for infrastructure projects. For example,
the sta⁄ report for the new PSI for Uganda states that ￿[the programme] will
continue to target investment spending to address Uganda￿ s large infrastructure
gap while maintaining low in￿ ation, a ￿ exible exchange rate and a comfortable
level of international reserves. In view of prospective declines in aid, ￿nancing
will rely more on domestic revenue and additional external sources, including
on less concessional terms.￿ 11 However, the literature on the catalytic e⁄ects
of IMF lending indicates that being under under the continued tutelage of the
Fund could come at the cost of lower in￿ ows of such capital, thus at least delay-
ing the true graduation of these countries from aid dependence. Indeed, even
the Fund itself is concerned that it might stigmatize its clients (c.f. Box 1 in
IMF 2008). Thus, it is pertinent to ask whether the PSI certi￿es participants
as commercially creditworthy or brands them as lemons that should still be
con￿ned to receiving concessional ￿ ows.
To evaluate the potentially contradictory e⁄ects of a non-funded IMF pro-
gramme such as the PSI on ￿nancial ￿ ows from other sources, I extend and
adapt the model in Hagen (2009). The model is extended by adding aid donors
to evaluate the impact of gatekeeping and adapted to consider the implications
for a speci￿c programme of policy ￿certi￿cation￿ . 12 In section 2, I sketch the
components of the model. The results are presented in section 3. Section 4
contains my concluding comments.
2 Building Stones for Modelling the PSI
2.1 Preliminaries
There are four kinds of agents that need to be modelled in order to analyse the
PSI. Obviously, ￿rst of all there must be a poor member country that has made
a request to have its policies scrutinised in the context of the PSI. Secondly, and
equally obvious, the likely behaviour of the IMF must be investigated. Given the
Fund￿ s privileged access to the authorities of the member country and the threat
9The exceptions are Cape Verde and Nigeria. The other ￿ve have bene￿tted from the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initivative (MDRI) too.
10With the exception of Rwanda they also have the lowest concessionality requirements due
to their low risk of debt distress, c.f. Table 1 in IMF (2009b).
11P. 4, IMF Country Report 10/132.
12On the other hand the issue of the relative merits of multilateral lending and certi￿cation
that is the main focus of that paper is not considered here.
5of terminating a programme if the latter do not provide the information required,
I assume that the former acquires an informational advantage with respect to
the last two types of agents, private lenders and o¢ cial donors. Through its
statements about what it ￿nds during reviews the IMF might seek to relinquish
this advantage or to retain it.
Donors and commercial providers of ￿nance need to be included in the model
as their responses to the announcements of the IMF will in￿ uence the latter. As
noted above, donors might use the ￿certi￿cate￿issued by the IMF to determine
whether the country is more or less deserving of aid. This would only be a
normal extension of the Fund￿ s gatekeeping role with respect to macroeconomic
developments to a situation where it does not provide resources of its own. I
also pointed out that the countries with a PSI are interested in attracting pri-
vate foreign capital and that the Fund has indeed granted them more leeway
with respect to non-￿nancial borrowing than most other members that qualify
for concessional lending. Private lenders might change their decisions with re-
spect to lending to the country in question after digesting the IMF￿ s statement
about the potential borrower￿ s policies. I thus study their behaviour and how
it in￿ uences Fund decision-making as well. The timing of events is depicted in
Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
I ￿rst study the optimal behaviour of the member country, commercial
lenders, and aid donors (in that order). These results are prerequisites for
analysing what the IMF will do with the ￿ndings of its PSI reviews
2.2 The Member Country
To simplify the analysis as much as possible without leaving out anything of
essence for the results I assume that the country may be either of only two
types. Implicit in the PSI-approach is the notion that the Fund￿ s seal of approval
should enable programme countries to tap private capital ￿ ows to a greater case
than they can on their own. To see whether and when this is indeed the case
there needs to be some heterogeneity amongst countries that could request a
PSI. Two types of countries, with only one having the requisite characteristics
for being commercially creditworthy, are both necessary and su¢ cient for an
interesting analysis.
The ￿rst archtype is a country that is not truly a ￿mature stabiliser￿ , i.e.,
its policies still leaves something to be desired, especially with respect to being
commercially creditworthy. A country of this type should only receive aid,
if anything. The other archtype, however, although still poor, has economic
policies and an institutional framework in place that makes it safe for private
lenders to lend if they are fully aware of its true characteristics. More speci￿cally,
the supposed di⁄erence between the types H and L is that the former has
higher marginal returns to investment than the latter. This is a useful analytical
shortcut as the returns to investing in a country realistically depend on many
of the policies and institutional features that the IMF is supposed to assess in
its reviews under the PSI.
6The government of the borrower country chooses investment and interna-




where ’ is the discount factor. The budget constraints are
Ci












Ii if default: (2b)
That is, in period 1 the country has some exogenous income Y1 and may
augment period 1 consumption (Ci
1) through international borrowing (Bi) at an
interest rate of ri or aid (Ai) and period 2 consumption (Ci
2) through investment
(Ii), with the values of these variables potentially depending on the kind of
equilibrium emerging as well as country type. If type i fully services its debt




I) are available for consumption
in period 2. If it defaults by paying creditors anything less than principal plus
interest it incurs the loss of a fraction of period 2 income ￿ 2 (0;1).13 As
already noted I assume ￿H > ￿L. This means that H have a higher capability
of servicing its debt than L other things being equal.
Given the linearity of the borrower￿ s objective function there are potentially
a large number of cases to consider. To focus on the most interesting and realistic
ones, I therefore make some assumptions on the main parameters such as the
rates of return, the discount rate of the government, and the penalty rate.14 The
assumptions ￿rst of all imply ￿H > ￿ > ￿L, i.e., that it is e¢ cient that only
the H-type invests if it is charged the risk-free interest rate ￿. They also imply
that the time-preferences of the sovereign are such that in fact only the H-type
invests, given no default. Moreover, given the linearity of the objective function
it invests all funds available: IH = Y1 +A+B. On the other hand, L might be
thought of as ￿truly￿not creditworthy as it will not invest even in the best of
circumstances, and instead, perhaps, as being a natural candidate for receiving
aid only. In sum the assumptions thus imply UL = CL
1 and UH = ’CH
2 .
2.3 Private lenders
In the market for sovereign debt depicted here, there are two types of market
failure. The ￿rst one is moral hazard. Ex post, a sovereign cannot be forced
to respect its obligations by legal means as there are no international courts
in which it can be sued. And despite legal changes over recent decades that
have done away with absolute sovereignity in the major creditor country courts,
the fact remains that it is hard to enforce verdicts favouring lenders, especially
13This assumption is common in the literature on sovereign debt, c.f. the review by Eaton
and Fernandez (1995).
14These assumptions are stated in the appendix together with the rest of the technicalities
behind the results derived here.
7when the sovereign is a poor one. Developing country governments rarely have
su¢ ciently valuable assets abroad that can be seized in such an event.15 The
result is credit rationing in equilibrium.
Secondly, here there is adverse selection. The bad type country should not
be given credit. It does not invest and so has no repayment capacity come
period 2. As we shall see the good type is able and willing to honour some debt
contracts. However, if the IMF does not provide reliable information beyond
that already possessed by private lenders the amount of credit and the terms
given will in equilibrium re￿ ect the risk that the borrower is a lemon.
The ex ante probability that lenders attach to i = L is p 2 (0;1). The
amount invested by the country is assumed to be unobservable to lenders. In
combination with the linearity of the objective function of the authorities, this
precludes the country from being a strategic player in the game and makes the
information provided by the IMF about its type crucial to the decisions of private
lenders.16 There are only pure-strategy equilibria in the game analysed here.
This means that either borrower type is revealed to lenders (in a separating
equilibrium) or they learn nothing and must go by their priors (in a pooling
equilibrium). In making their decisions they play Nash against donors, i.e.,
they take the level of aid the country receives as given.
With a strictly positive penalty rate, the critical value of debt at which
the borrower is indi⁄erent between servicing it and incurring the loss implied









Of course, it is never optimal for lenders to lend more than B
i
if the country￿ s
type is known. Therefore, in general the volume of lending is supply-determined
in this model. Lenders are risk-neutral and maximise expected pro￿ts, with the
risk-free rate of interest on the world market being their opportunity cost. I
make the standard assumption of a competitive market in the sense of no pro￿ts
in expectation. I also simplify by assuming that although losses are in￿ icted on
the borrower if it defaults lenders receive nothing. Denoting the probability of
default by ￿, the no-expected-pro￿ts condition is then




If the IMF￿ s intervention does not reveal new information to lenders, the
posterior probability that i = L equals p too. In a pooling equilibrium, lenders
are not able to distinguish the two types. Even though the H-type might be
willing to pay an interest rate higher than ￿ in order to get more credit, so is
15For more on the legal issues of sovereign debt, see e.g. Roubini and Setser (2004) and
Panizza et al. (2009).
16Acharya and Diwan (1993) have shown that a debtor buying back its debt might signal
its willingness to invest to creditors. To concentrate on the IMF￿ s strategic role I therefore
assume that the country￿ s initial debt is zero.
8L, which never invests and thus always defaults on any B > 0. Therefore the
two types can neither be screened nor signal their type. Hence, in a pooling
equilibrium lenders are con￿ned to o⁄ering terms that are not type-contingent.
B obviously will not be so high that both types prefer to default. On the other
hand, lending nothing would leave potential pro￿ts on the table since there is
a strictly positive probability that the country is of type H and thus will repay
some levels of debt given some risk-adjusted interest rates. This means that the
pooling equilibrium credit limit B
P
must be such that with certainty L defaults
and H repays the loan with interest. As thus ￿ = p, rP =
1+￿
1￿p ￿ 1 > ￿.
In a separating equilibrium, the IMF reveals the country￿ s type to the mar-
ket. Then lending no more than B
i
is risk-free, i.e., ￿ = 0. Due to competition





because IL = 0; if the country has low returns to investment it will be shut o⁄










(A) are increasing in the amount of aid a good type
receives in the two equilibria. As all aid is invested it increases the repayment
capacity of H and thus the credit limits it faces.17
In sum, lenders have only three responses in pure strategy equilibria: they





. These contracts, which are indexed by j, are illustrated in Figure 2.











1+￿ ; if i = H;
(5)
be ex post pro￿ts discounted by ￿ if the country of type i is given the
contract Dj, taking into account the fact that an L-type (H-type) always (never)
defaults. In combination with the linearity of the borrower￿ s objective function,
discounting pro￿ts by the lenders￿own opportunity cost makes it commensurate
with consumption in the capital-importing countries in the following sense: if a
unit of funds is borrowed but not repaid, borrower consumption increases by one
unit in period 1 without any reduction in period 2; while the period 2 decrease
in the consumption of lenders is ￿(1 + ￿), which is equal to ￿1 in terms of
period 1 consumption. Hence, in this way borrowers and lenders are treated
symmetrically in the model. This simpli￿es the analysis that follows.
2.4 Donors
Aid donors are assumed to care about consumption levels in the recipient coun-
try. However, their intertemporal preferences are not necessarily the same as
17For an analysis of the impact of aid on commercial credit from a di⁄erent perspective, see
Pedersen (2003).
9those of the authorities there. Moreover, giving aid is assumed to be costly.







where ￿ > 0 is the marginal cost of aid. Donors are assumed to have the
same priors over country type as private lenders. They will then also attach
the same posterior probability to the possibility that country type is L after
having heard the IMF￿ s speech as the latter do. Recalling that donors play
Nash against lenders, it is straightforward to ￿nd the optimal levels of grant-aid

















Note that the level of private lending does not a⁄ect the amount of aid given.
This is due to donors￿objective function being linear in consumption levels in
the developing country. In a more general fomulation, more private credit would
lead to a smaller grant. However, as this has no bearing on the results derived
here I prefer the simpler speci￿cation in (6).
It is easy to see that there is a critical value of donors￿discount factor that
result in AL = AP = AH. I will label it ￿
￿. For lower discount factors, a
member country that is not commercially creditworthy gets more aid than one
that have access international credit markets, contingent on types being known.
On the other hand, if donors put more weight on future outcomes than ￿
￿ the
type with low returns to investment gets less aid than the one with high returns.
￿ < ￿
￿ might seem like the most reasonable assumption to make. For one
thing, it generates a ￿natural￿division of labour between donors and lenders -
the former compensate the lemons for the lack of lending by the latter by giving
them more aid - that to some extent mimicks what we actually observe. More-
over, both theoretical and empirical studies strongly suggest that aid policies
are prone to being dynamically inconsistent due to various bureaucratic and
political failures.18 Ex ante donors might try to impose certain conditionalities
to be ful￿lled in order to receive aid, but ex post it often turns out to be the case
that these threats are not credible. For example, aid agencies are no di⁄erent
than other public agencies when it comes to disbursement pressures. Because
unused funds is often interpreted by bureauractic and political principals as a
18For theoretical analyses, see Hagen (2006), Martens et al. (2002). Pedersen (1996, 2001),
and Svensson (2000). On the record of multilateral conditionality, see e.g. Mosley et al.
(1991), Killick (1998), Dollar and Svensson (1998), Ivanova et al. (2003), and Easterly (2005).
10lack of ￿need￿ , agencies usually spend all funds available in a budget year.19
Thus, threatening a recalcitrant recipient government with withholding aid is
rarely credible.
The problem is often aggravated by political failure. An altruistic donor will
have a hard time ignoring need even if the magnitude of need is at least partly
due to recipients not having ful￿lled preconditions to which it has agreed. Thus,
this Samaritan￿ s Dilemma is another reason why, for example, empirical studies
￿nd rates of implementation of aid conditionalities to be rather poor. In the
current context, this literature can be broadly summarised as predicting that
￿lemons￿will be rewarded due to greater need, which is what the assumption
￿ < ￿
￿ implies.
However, over the last decade or so there has been much talk about improv-
ing aid by measures such as fostering ownership on the part of recipients and
allocating aid selectively to good performers. This rhetoric can be interpreted as
implying that donors will take a more long-term view and focus on supporting
those recipients that pursue policies conducive to developing their economies.
Indeed, there is some evidence that donors have become more selective.20 In
the model analysed here this can be captured by assuming ￿ > ￿
￿ so that
AH > AP > AL. Below, I study the consequences of both assumptions.
2.5 Resource Flows, Pro￿ts, and Welfare
It is time to summarise the analysis so far by calculating resource ￿ ows to the
developing country in di⁄erent equilibria as these determine the payo⁄s to the
other actors, which in turn feeds into the IMF￿ s objectives (considered in the
next section). The ￿rst step is to use the results on aid to calculate the level
of credit that the developing country will receive. Recalling that B
L
(A) = 0
and that donors and lenders will have the same posterior beliefs, this simply
amounts to inserting AH in B
H
(A) and AP in B
P
(A).





. In the absence of aid, the good type receives higher in￿ ows than the
bad type, with the pooling equilibrium level being in between. This re￿ ects the
fact that lenders are willing to lend to H-types but not to L-types. Naturally,
this ranking is preserved when AH > AP > AL as well as for ￿ close to ￿
￿.
However, for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ the lemon receives higher total ￿ ows in period 1 than the
good type for low enough values of the marginal cost of aid. In other words, if





Next, consider the levels of country welfare implied by the reactions of donors
and lenders to the news that the IMF provides. I denote the welfare of a
19If anything, the problem is magni￿ed in the sphere of aid by the broken feed-back loop from
ultimate bene￿ciaries (the poor in developing countries) to the ultimate donors (taxpayers in
rich countries), which tend to make outputs such as the amount spent the measuring rod for
performance instead of outcomes on the ground.
20See e.g. Dollar and Levin (2006) and Claessens et al. (2009).
11type i developing country that has been given contract a contract of type j by
commercial lenders and corresponding amounts of aid by Uij. A necessary and
su¢ cient condition for an L-type country at least weakly preferring separation
to being mistaken for the other type is FL
1 ￿ FH
1 . The logic is that as the bad
type does not invest it prefers to have foreign resource ￿ ows maximised. The
composition does not matter for L; loans are equivalent to grants because it
will not repay and, what is more, su⁄ers no costs from defaulting. On the other





are not also identical with respect to their components. The H-type will prefer
to have a smaller loan and more aid as it knows that it will ￿nd it optimal to
repay the loan with interest in period 2.
What about lenders? If the borrower is creditworthy, they prefer that the
IMF does not provide them with additional information. The logic behind this
somewhat surprising result is that when there is full information any pure pro￿ts
are competed away. On the other hand, if the IMF￿ s statement leaves lenders no
wiser than they were at the outset they will charge a risk-premium re￿ ecting the
possibility of the country not being creditworthy. Ex ante the premium is such
that expected pro￿ts are zero, but ex post lenders will either make pure pro￿ts
(if the country turns out to be of the good type) or lose money (if it is actually
a lemon). In a sense, the Fund can help lenders ￿collude￿if surveillance has
revealed i = H by keeping this knowledge secret, but it can also induce transfers
from them to the developing country by keeping them in the dark about the fact
that it is not creditworthy. If the country is a lemon, lenders￿ex post pro￿ts
are obviously maximised if the IMF reveals this fact.
2.6 The IMF
As noted I assume that before the borrower interact with lenders and donors
country type is revealed to the IMF. This may be thought of as the IMF con-
ducting a review that is completely accurate with respect to the value of ￿i.21
Of course, if this is a permanent feature of the country one would expect inter-
ested third-parties to learn its type as time goes by. However, circumstances
and policies change over time, so it is more fruitful to picture this parameter as
expressing the ￿current￿state of the member country.22
Upon concluding a PSI review the IMF makes a statement about its ￿ndings
that may signal what is then its private information to lenders. It chooses its
communication strategy to maximise a weighted average of the other agents￿
objective functions:
Wij = !Uij + ￿￿ij + (1 ￿ ! ￿ ￿)V ij; i = L;H;j = L;H;P; (8)
21It is of course unrealistic to assume that the IMF becomes as knowledgeable as the coun-
try￿ s authorities, but it is a useful simpli￿cation at this stage. Moreover, the results should
continue to hold as long as the IMF has an informational advantage over private lenders and
donors. Including information costs is left for future research.
22Admittedly, this formulation is somewhat awkward in a two-period model. However, the
important point is that the model is static, and considering the dynamics of this state variable
would take us too far a￿eld.
12where Uij, ￿ij, and V ij re￿ ect the results derived above, !;￿ 2 (0;1), and
! + ￿ ￿ 1. This objective function may be rationalised in the following way.
The interests of all other agents in the model are to some extent important to
the IMF. The purposes of the organisation set forth in its Articles of Agreement
re￿ ect the overarching objective of contributing to the welfare of its members.
Thus, U is a relevant argument of W. The importance of ￿ to the IMF might be
argued in several ways. For example, pro￿ts from commercial lending obviously
accrue to institutions in some member countries, contributing to their national
income. Also, the Fund is charged with maintaining the international ￿nancial
system. This means that is has to look after the interests of both sides of the
market. Similarly, in a dynamic perspective, the IMF must keep one eye on how
its actions impact on the bottom line of capital providers to retain credibility
with markets and thus being able to in￿ uence them.
The ful￿llment of donor objectives could also be seen as re￿ ective of the
pursuance of members￿interests. Moreover, in most poor countries the IMF
interact with bilateral aid agencies year in, year out. To maintain a working
relationship with them and preserve its problematic but status-conferring role
as gatekeeper with respect to accessing aid budgets, it needs to factor in the
goals of these actors when presenting its assessments of the macroeconomic
situation in a recipient.23 If the country in question is a client of an important
shareholder such as the US, this issue could take on added importance. However,
beyond certain hotspots like Iraq and Afghanistan geopolitics is generally of
lesser importance for aid allocation in the post Cold War era. This would
probably be an accurate description with respect to the current PSI countries
at least. In any case, the framework is ￿ exible enough to allow us to ignore the
donors￿goals (by setting ! + ￿ = 1), which is what I will actually do below
PSIs have a three-year duration. Reviews are to be conducted on a semi-
annual basis, and a PSI will automatically lapse if two consecutive reviews are
not completed. That is, if Fund sta⁄ two times in a row ￿nd reasons for not
granting the seal of approval, whether because policies are not up to the standard
(upper tranche conditionality) or because not enough high-quality information
has been provided by the authorities, the PSI will be terminated. This implies
that over the course of such a review cycle the Fund can send four sequences of
messages. It can give the thumbs up twice in a row, in principle signalling that
this is a country with a sound policy framework. Or it can withdraw its en-
dorsement both times, thus certainly leaving the impression that the member￿ s
policies are seriously lacking in quality. Finally, it can mix yes and no, in both
cases sending no clear message to outside parties about the member.
23Both the latter argument as well as the argument about the need for maintaining a
reputation with capital market participants are really arguments about the Fund￿ s long-term
incentives. In a static model like the current one, however, they can be usefully be taken as
arguments for including the objectives of these actors amongst those that are more narrowly
the IMF￿ s own goals.
133 Equilibrium Reviews of a PSI
3.1 Cheap Talk Equilibria
The PSI can be thought of as giving rise to a game of ￿cheap-talk￿between
the IMF and donors and lenders, where the latter update their beliefs about
a participating country after thinking through the Fund￿ s incentives to make
truthful statements. By de￿nition, cheap-talk does not directly a⁄ect pay-o⁄s.
In the current context the only way in which certi￿cation by the IMF can have
an impact is by changing the beliefs of third-parties about country type, thereby
inducing them to change their o⁄ers.
The applicable equilibrium concept for this type of game is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE behaviour is rational given beliefs, with Bayes￿
Rule determining beliefs along the equilibrium path. As is well-known, there are
usually more than one PBE. I adopt the approach to re￿ning the equilibrium set
of messages advocated by Farrell (1993). That is, I assume i) all agents share
a common language and ii) this language is ￿rich￿ . The common language
assumption implies that the literal meaning of any message is clear, so that
incentives to deceive are the only barriers to communication. The rich language
assumption does two things. It rules out the so-called ￿babbling￿equilibrium
in which donors and lenders treat all statements as containing no information
and therefore go by their priors, in turn making it equilibrium behaviour for
the Fund to send all possible messages with the same positive probability. As
there are no unused messages, there is no way we can check the plausibility of
this equilibrium by studying what would happen if something that goes unsaid
in equilibrium suddenly was stated (an out-of equilibrium message was sent),
which is the standard way of re￿ning PBE. But Farrell (1993: 518) notes that the
babbling equilibrium is not very plausible: ￿It requires [the sender] to randomize
extensively, saying some very unnatural things, not for his own sake but for
the sake of equilibrium.￿ 24 The rich language assumption does away with this
uninteresting candidate equilibrium by always allowing for some other way of
saying anything.
This opens for a certain way of re￿ning the set of equilibria. More speci￿cally,
I apply Farrel￿ s (1993) concept of neologism-proofness when this is necessary to
sharpen the predictions. This works as follows. Suppose there is an out-of-
equilibrium message (a neologism) with the literal meaning, say, ￿the country
is of type H￿ . This neologism is ￿self-signalling￿if and only if the IMF would
like donors and lenders to believe this statement only when it is true. Then,
an equilibrium in which this statement is not made is not neologism-proof if
the IMF has an incentive to use it (i.e., is better o⁄ than in the purported
equilibrium if the message is sent and believed).
With this prerequisite in place, there are essentially only three meanings that
the IMF can communicate to third-parties in a pure-strategy PBE, to which I
without loss of generality con￿ne attention. Besides ￿the country is L￿and ￿the
country is H￿ , the IMF may not convince lenders and donors that either is true,
24A similar critiscism is voiced in Farrell and Rabin (1996).
14leaving them to go by their priors. The last case is equivalent to making the
statement ￿(N)o comment.￿This message may be seen as shorthand for all kinds
of uninformative statements. I therefore assume that the possible messages are
L, H, and N and that in all pooling PBE the IMF says N. The latter assumption
implies that there are always neologisms available even though I restrict the size
of the message space.25 These three messages H, L, and N correspond fairly
closely to the meaning conveyed by two consecutive PSI reviews: H is equivalent
to two successful reviews, L to two times non-completion, and N to one reviewed
being concluded and the other not.
3.2 Two Benchmarks
To limit the length of the paper I assume !+￿ = 1 in the following. The IMF￿ s
objective function (8) then reduces to Wij = !Uij +(1 ￿ !)￿ij. After a review
revealing i = L we thus have
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One angle on the results derived below follows from assuming that the coun-
terfactual is no IMF programme. This is the benchmark used in Hagen (2009).
Third-parties then have to go by their priors and ￿rst period capital ￿ ows will
be FP
1 = AP +B
P
. The country repays its debt with interest if it is truly com-
mercially creditworthy and reneges on the contract otherwise. Hence, lenders
lose money if the IMF member is a lemon. On the other hand, they earn pure
pro￿ts if the country is of the good type.
No IMF programme is perhaps the counterfactual that puts the e⁄ects of the
PSI in starkest relief. However, it is not the only one. A second useful bench-
mark for the analysis that follows is the case of no aid, which was investigated
25If pooling at L or H was allowed for, I would have to change the message space when
investigating whether such PBE are neologism-proof to maintain the possibility of the IMF
literally stating, say, that the review revealed i = H (as a pooling equilibrium statement H
would then convey the meaning ￿no comment￿). As noted, Farrell (1993) also assumes that
neologisms are always available.
15in Hagen (2009). There is then a critical value of ! equal to 0:5 such that for
lower (higher) values of the weight on country welfare in the IMF￿ s objective
function the unique neologism-proof PBE is separating (pooling).26 This is in
the spirit of cheap-talk games as it shows that in order for the quilibrium to be
informative the interests of senders and receivers of messages need to be su¢ -
ciently aligned. In this particular case, the sender is the IMF and lenders are
the receivers. Thus, lenders only believe the Fund￿ s statement about borrower
country type if they know that it places a su¢ ciently high weight on their in-
terests, i.e., pro￿ts. The intuition behind the critical value being 0:5 is that as
the bad type neither invests nor repays debts, a loan is a pure transfer in this
event. Given the linearity of its objective function, the Fund is only indi⁄erent
to a transfer from creditors to debtors being made if it places equal weight on
country welfare and lenders￿pro￿ts.27 If the IMF cares less (more) about the
borrower than its creditors it will (not) make a trutful statement after having
learned that i = L.
There is also a pooling PBE for ! < 0:5, but it is not neologism-proof as
the IMF wants to tell the truth if the country is a lemon and does not want to
make lenders believe it is not creditworthy if it is in fact so. Thus, if the out-
of-equilibrium message L is made, lenders should realise that it is true.28 And
if they do, the IMF will speak the truth when the country is not creditworthy.
This breaks the pooling equilibrium.
In other words, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium to
be informative is that regardless of what the review reveals the IMF does not
want to fool third-parties:
WLL ￿ WLH; (11a)
WHH ￿ WHL: (11b)
If these conditions do not hold, the equilibrium cannot be separating and
lenders as well as donors will learn nothing from when the result of the review
is made public. Their decisions will then be guided by their priors.
3.3 Results
If aid levels are very high and heavily skewed in favour of the type of country
that is not creditworthy, the equilibrium statement made by the IMF cannot be
informative. The IMF will not be able to make a truthful statement and have
it believed as both lenders and donors know that it has an incentive to portray
the member country in the way that maximises aid ￿ ows. This holds regardless
26C.f. Proposition 2.
27The normalisation in (5) contributes to the cleanliness of the result, but obviously does
not a⁄ect it qualitatively.
28That is, as WLL > WLP and WHL < WHP for such low values of !, the neologism L is
self-signalling.
16of the relative weighting of country welfare and pro￿ts in the institution￿ s ob-
jective function. In such a case, the PSI is not working according to intention.
Outcomes are the same whether an eligible member is in the programme or not.
The second benchmark provides a perspective on how a non-￿nancial pro-
gramme like the PSI works in an aid-dependent country when donors are heavily
focused on needs. It then becomes apparent that the IMF￿ s seal of approval can
be rendered worthless in such circumstances. Without aid, the Fund￿ s statement
will be informative as long as it puts no more relative weight on country welfare
than 50%. When much larger amounts of aid go to countries that are not com-
mercially creditworthy, the IMF will be tempted to play down the possibilities
for tapping commercial ￿nance for members that actually have them so as to
avoid a disproportionate drop in concessional ￿ ows. Hence, in this case one
could by extension argue that the PSI works perversely by reducing commercial
￿ ows and leaving creditworthy members dependent on the aid ￿ ows that are
currently the main component of inward capital ￿ ows for them. While this is in
their short-run interest, it is most likely not the best development strategy in
the longer run. Moreover, as lenders will get their ￿ngers burnt by lending pos-
itive amounts to lemons when aid clouds the picture there is a possibility that
the mature stabilisers￿graduation from aid dependence could also be delayed
by the supply-side￿ s unwillingness to engage with such countries.
For less generous aid ￿ ows that satisfy AH < AL, there exists a critical value
of ! such that the equilibrium is separating for lower values of this parameter
and there is pooling for higher values. In other words, in this region we obtain
qualitatively the same results as in Hagen (2009). Compared to a situation with
no IMF programme, the PSI thus potentially enables mature stabilisers to access
international credit markets. This goal is achieved if the objectives governing
the review process do not favour poor member countries too much. Furthermore,
quantitatively the critical value !￿ is higher than in the second benchmark: with
modest aid ￿ ows targeted at low-productivity economies, !￿ > 0:5. That is, the
space for separation is enlarged and the space for pooling is reduced compared to
the e⁄ects of IMF certi￿cation in a member not receiving aid. This is due to aid
￿ ows weakening the incentive to mimick when i = L without generating one for
i = H. At ￿rst glance it seems that in these circumstances gatekeeping works as
well as it can. However, the welfare e⁄ects are not necessarily straightforward
as the bad type loses when the good member country gains.
When ￿ > ￿
￿ it is only the preferences of the IMF that matters for the
degree of informativeness of the equilibrium. However, then !￿ < 0:5. The
intuition for this result is perhaps best illustrated by considering the special
case of ￿ = ￿
￿. Then the same amount of aid is given whether the equilibrium





Because only relative pay-o⁄s matter this implies that !￿ = 0:5, as is apparent
from (9a) and (9b). When the review is of no consequence for the amount of aid
provided, the trade-o⁄ is the same as in the case without aid. Hiding the fact
that the country is not commercially creditworthy by stating the opposite would
if the strategy was successful saddle lenders with a loss of ￿1 in period 1 terms
17for a gain of one unit of period 1 consumption for the country. As noted above,
the Fund can only be indi⁄erent to e⁄ecting such a transfer if !￿ = 0:5. It is
then easily seen that once donors give more aid to more productive recipients,
the IMF would have an incentive to conceal the true results of a review showing
i = L even if it weighs country welfare and pro￿ts equally. Thus, !￿ must
be lower than 0:5 in this case. The comparison with the ￿rst benchmark is
unpeturbed in the sense that there are values of !￿ such that the equilibrium
is separating, highlighting the potential of a PSI to be informative of country
characteristics of relevance to both donors and lenders. However, compared to
the second benchmark we see that now the gatekeeping role of the IMF actually
reduces the possibility that its seal of approval is valuable to third-parties.
3.4 Discussion
In sum, the consequences of the IMF signalling to two distinct audiences - com-
mercial lenders and aid donors - produce complex e⁄ects. In the worst-case
scenario, the gatekeeping role eliminates the IMF￿ s potential for helping lenders
distinguish creditworthy countries from lemons. Then credit-market access is
hindered and aid-dependency perpetuated. In the best case, aid supports sig-
nalling to credit markets by compensating member countries that are not com-
mercially creditworthy. By enlarging the space for separating the good and
the bad, donors increase the likelihood that the IMF facilitates the provision
of private ￿nance to mature stabilisers. In the intermediate case, selective aid
paradoxically weakens the prospects of achieving this goal by aggravating the
consequences of being branded a lemon. While still potentially better than no
arrangement with the Fund, in this scenario PSI participants do worse than a
member country in a corresponding certi￿cation process receiving no aid.
Both in the intermediate case and in the best-case scenario the ultimate
determinant of outcomes is the IMF￿ s relative weighting of country welfare and
pro￿ts. There are four reasons why one can expect the IMF to put great em-
phasis on the welfare of the country having requested a PSI (i.e., ! being fairly
large). First of all, eligible members are poor. From a normative perspective it
is thus justi￿able that the consequences of the IMF￿ s actions on their welfare
are given due weight. The Fund has also put considerable e⁄ort into revamping
its facilities for low-income countries, suggesting that it certainly take its role
in this part of the membership seriously.
Secondly, the systemic consequences of neglecting the impact on providers
of capital are small. Given the poverty of the potential borrowers, the sums
lent will in any case be small. Hence, the IMF do not have to worry whether
any losses to lenders will have wider repercussions on the global economy. This
probably also implies that the usual political pressures from major shareholders
on Fund decision-making does not apply.29
Thirdly, although not without precursors (albeit more informal), this is a
new arrangement. While the IMF could apply strict rules to signal that the
29For recent reviews of the political economy of the IMF, see Bird (2007) and Steinwand
and Stone (2008).
18PSI is supposed to be a mechanism for establishing beyond doubt the high
quality of policies and institutions in participating members, it would seem
more reasonable to expect some initial slacking of standards to increase demand.
The institution￿ s history is replete with examples of facilities being created and
abolished after hardly having been used, the Contingent Credit Line being only
the most recent one. The Fund would be embarrassed if it turned out that it has
spent resources developing yet another service for which there are no customers,
even if its own ￿nancial position right now is less precarious than it has been in
recent years.
Finally, the organisation is in general reluctant to explicitly criticise its mem-
bers, which after all are the principals of the international bureaucrats sta¢ ng
it. As noted in IMF (2004: 34-35), there are two main reasons why the Fund
tends to avoid critiscism: ￿First, the Fund fears that negative signals would
undermine the frankness of its dialogue with the authorities. Second, the Fund
is concerned that negative signals could bring serious negative consequences for
the member: in a country with access to capital markets, they could trigger the
very crisis the Fund would be seeking to avert; and in an aid-recipient country,
they could lead to a sharp reduction in foreign ￿nancing.￿This could be con-
strued as a revealed preference for sending muddled signals. The formal analysis
in this paper then demonstrates that the admirable goal of facilitating access
for PSI participants to international capital markets might not attainable with-
out changing the Fund￿ s own incentive structures. It also highlights how the
institution￿ s operations is inexorably linked with the behaviour of aid donors
in the countries in question. The Fund has been under considerable pressure
in recent years to allow the ￿scaling-up￿of aid to help achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. At the same time a somewhat greater proportion of bi-
lateral aid is being given in the form of budget-support, which is potentially
sensitive to the IMF￿ s portrayal of members￿policies. To evaluate the impact
of the gatekeeping role on the signal sent to commercial lenders - and thus the
prospects of any particular PSI arrangement - is admittedly not an easy task.
But especially at a time of ￿nancial crisis it is easy to believe that the IMF is
tempted to put the gloss on its reviews in order to keep aid ￿ owing even if this
might come at the cost of worsened prospects for attracting commercial ￿nance
to PSI participants.
The only indication in favour of the best case being the relevant one that I
can see is the fact that most countries that have already had a PSI have signed a
second agreement, the special case of Nigeria being the only exception. Mozam-
bique, Senegal, and Tanzania even did so after having been temporarily back in
￿nancial arrangements (with programmatic contents determined by their PSIs).
It could thus be that these so-called mature stabilisers see the PSI as a useful
half-way house on their way to graduation from aid, allowing the IMF to keep
aid ￿ owing while at the same time signalling to commercial actors that they
are not basket cases in need of its subsidised credits anymore. However, why
rejecting cheap loans while accepting grants should signal commercial creditwor-
thiness remain unclear, especially as Hagen (2009) shows that subsidised IMF
credit achieves more separation than mere certi￿cation. And even if accessing
19the Fund￿ s concessional facilities is stigmatizing in some other way, it is unclear
why it is the money that stains and not the conditionality, which is the same as
for the PSI. Indeed, the discussion of stigma in IMF (2008) only lists possible
reasons for not approaching the Fund, not why some of its services or products
might be more stigmatizing than others.
4 Conclusion: Certi￿ed or Branded?
The question motivating this paper is whether a certi￿cation mechanism such as
the PSI can work in countries still highly dependent on aid or will only serve to
brand them as not yet ready to enter commercial credit markets. The theoretical
model does not present a clear-cut answer. It shows that there are instances
where the scale and pro￿le of aid allocations combine with the IMF￿ s objectives
to both allow more information to be transmitted to third-parties compared
to no arrangement at all and to raise the potential for IMF communication to
be more informative than in a hypothetical case where participants receive no
aid. However, I would argue that the odds are stacked against such outcomes
being realised. There are organisational imperatives that work at cross-purposes
with the aim of facilitating access to non-concessional ￿nance for the mature
stabilisers the mechanism is aimed at: promoting the new service as well as the
￿do-no-harm￿culture censoring negative signals. The systemic consequences are
small as well: here we are talking about Tanzania, not Thailand, Mozambique,
not Mexico. Finally, eligible members have low incomes and remain dependent
on aid. Given the conventional behaviour of donors, this is likely to imply that
each signal has both positive and negative consequences. Being branded a lemon
could mean being certi￿ed as needy; conversely, being certi￿ed as creditworthy
could mean being branded as unworthy of receiving aid. It is then entirely
plausible that giving due weight to the short- to medium-term interests of PSI-
countries the IMF should make sure concessional funds keep ￿ owing, even if
this results in the commercial credit that its richer members rely on remaining
unavailable. The case for the PSI rests on the continued demand for the service
by those that have experience with it, as well as indications of demand from
other countries in a similar position. This is not fool-proof evidence for the
theoretical best case being the applicable one, as participants could merely be
trying to escape a perceived stigma of accessing the IMF￿ s concessional facilities.
But the defence could use it to argue that the jury is still out on the weaker
proposition that the PSI is a useful addition to the Fund￿ s tool kit for low-income
members.
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To ￿nd optimal aid policies, recall that CL
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21The results stated in equations (7a ￿ c) in the main text thus follows. As
￿￿ < 0, the second-order conditions are satis￿ed in all three cases. The rela-
tive volumes of aid depend on ￿ R ￿
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To derive equilibrium credit levels, ￿rst recall that if lenders believe the
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The following results can then be deduced:
Lemma A1
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Proof of Lemma A1:











This expression is negative at ￿ = ￿
￿. Given the maintained assumptions
on parameter values it is positive for ￿ = 0. Moreover, b ￿ can be seen to be
monotonically declining in ￿. Hence 9b ￿ 2 (0;￿
￿), such that b ￿ T 0 , ￿ S ￿
￿.
Since the marginal cost of aid is positive, FH
1 > FP
1 > FL
1 for all b ￿ ￿ ￿. For














i) A necessary and su¢ cient condition for an L-type country at least weakly
preferring separation to being mistaken for the other type is FL
1 ￿ FH
1 .
ii) A necessary but not su¢ cient condition for an H-type country at least
weakly preferring separation to being mistaken for the other type is FL
1 ￿ FH
1 .
Proof of Lemma A2:
Part i): ULL = Y1 + FL
1 and ULH = Y1 + FH
1 . Hence, ULL ￿ ULH ,
FL
1 ￿ FH


























, there exists b b ￿ > b ￿ such that ￿ ￿ b b ￿ , UHL ￿
UHH. For ￿ ￿ b b ￿, UHL ￿ UHH.
Proof of Corollary A1:











Parameter Assumption I, the right-hand side is a constant in (0;1). The left-
hand side goes to zero as ￿ goes to 1. When ￿ goes to zero, the left-hand side
becomes
￿






￿(1 + ￿H)￿ (1 + ￿H)
b b ￿ is de￿ned by equating this expression with the right-hand side. As the
limit is non-positive for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, b b ￿ < ￿
￿. It is also easily checked that b b ￿ > b ￿.
Moreover, since this limit of the left-hand side is monotonically decreasing in ￿
the result follows. Intuitively, b b ￿ > b ￿ as aid ￿ ows must be smaller to render the
good type indi⁄erent between being labelled L or H due to the costs associated
with commercial borrowing. This can also be veri￿ed by deriving explicitly the
expression for b b ￿. QED.
Lemma A3
If the borrower is creditworthy, lenders prefer that the IMF does not provide
them with additional information. However, if the country is a lemon, lenders￿
ex post pro￿ts are maximised if the IMF reveals this fact.
Proof of Lemma A3:
If i = H, but lenders do not know it, (5) in the main text show that dis-
counted ex post pro￿ts are positive due to the risk-premium charged. If type
is revealed competition leads to zero pro￿ts as rH = ￿. On the other hand,
if i = L, but lenders are unaware of this fact they will also charge rH > ￿.
However, as the bad type repays nothing, lenders will lose money ex post. This
contrasts with the zero expected and actual pro￿ts realised when they know the
country is a lemon and thus lends nothing. QED.
Proposition A1
There exists a set of parameters
￿







, a) ￿ < b b ￿, the equilibrium is pooling; b) ￿ ￿ b b ￿, the equilibrium
is separating for ! ￿ !￿ and pooling for ! > !￿;
ii) ￿ ￿ b b ￿, the equilibrium is separating for ! ￿ !￿ and pooling for ! > !￿.
Proof of Proposition A1:
When the country is commercially creditworthy, lenders will never lose money.
The IMF￿ s optimal message is then the one that maximises country welfare. By
Corrollary A1, for ￿ < b b ￿ and ￿ < b b ￿ the IMF wants to deceive lenders when
i = H. Thus, its statement cannot be informative in equilibrium. This proves
part ia). To prove parts ib) and ii), we must consider the IMF￿ s incentives when
23i = L. Then lenders will lose money if borrower country type is not revealed
to them, whereas the lemon will gain (C.f. Lemma A3). Comparing (9a) and
(9b) in the main text, one can derive the critical value !￿from WLL ￿ WLH. If
! > !￿ (! < !￿), the IMF would (not) like the country to gain at the expense
of lenders. Thus, the Fund will optimally tell the truth for both i = L and
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Proof of Corollary A2:
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:
By Corollary A1, b b ￿ > b ￿. Thus, by Lemma A1 FH
1 > FL
1 for ￿ ￿ b b ￿ and so
!￿ < 1. From the same results it also follows that FH
1 > FL
1 for ￿ ￿ b b ￿. We
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27Table 1: Current status of countries having entered a PSI-programme 
Country  Date of approval  Current status 
Cape Verde  July 31, 2006  8
th review completed. 1-year extension in preparation 
for 2
nd 3-year programme granted June 19, 2009. 
Second PSI (15 months) approved November 22, 2010 
Mozambique  June 18, 2007  Entered 1-year ESF-arrangement June 30, 2009. 
Second PSI approved June 14, 2010, 1
st review 
completed. 
Nigeria October  17,  2005  4
th and final review completed 
Rwanda  June 16, 2010  No reviews completed yet 
Senegal  November 2, 2007  6
th review completed. Entered ESF-arrangement 
December 19, 2008 (extended from 12 to 18 months). 
Second PSI approved December 3, 2010. 
Tanzania  February 16, 2007  First PSI extended when entering 1-year ESF-
arrangement May 29, 2009. Second PSI approved June 
4, 2010, 1
st review completed.  
Uganda  December 15, 2006  7
th review completed. 1-year extension in preparation 
for 2
nd 3-year programme granted December 21, 2009. 
Second PSI approved May 12, 2010. 
Note: The Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF) was renamed the Standby Credit Facility in 
January 2010 as part of the IMF’s revamping of its menu of programmes for LICs. However, 
ongoing ESF programmes will continue until they expire or are otherwise terminated. 
Source: IMF country reports and press releases. 
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